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Constitution, Congress, and Court: On
the Theory, Law, and Politics of
Appellate Jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court
By LELAND E. BECK*

Introduction
Since the founding of the Republic, relations between the United
States Congress and the Supreme Court often have exhibited the institutional tension and occasional conflict embodied in the constitutional
and political doctrines of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances. Any understanding of the constitutional relationship between Congress and the Court must begin with the premise that this
tension is essential to the functioning of the government; that it is not
only accepted, but expected. The variety of tensions and conflicts are
exemplified in the confirmation and attempted impeachment of justices; the judiciary's procedure, remedies, and jurisdiction; and the legitimacy, scope, and application of the doctrine of judicial review.'
This article will undertake the exposition of one constitutional question
of current tension and potential conflict between Congress and the
Court: whether the exceptions and regulations clause authorizes Congress to preclude the Supreme Court from adjudicating particular constitutional claims by excepting those cases from the Court's appellate
jurisdiction.2
Establishing the contours of the Court's appellate jurisdiction is as
obtuse a process as establishing the original jurisdiction is acute: The
appellate jurisdiction is conceptualized in the Constitution, while the
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. Legislative Attorney-Advisor, American
Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. B.A., 1973, M.A.,
1975, Kent State University; J.D., 1977, The American University; LL.M., 1981, Harvard
University. The author would like to thank Professor Archibald Cox and Mr. Johnny H.
Killian for their critical commentaries on drafts of this article. The views presented in this
article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Congressional Research
Service or any other organization of the United States Government.
1. Examples of each of these types of tension are included in the conceptual level
discussion at notes 30-57 and accompanying text infra.
2. The elements of this question are discussed at notes 6, 21-25 and accompanying text
infra.
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original jurisdiction is enumerated. The relevant portions of the jurisdiction clauses of article III provide:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish ....
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; . . .
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.3
Had the Framers unequivocally provided for the Court's appellate jurisdiction, or had they unequivocally provided the Congress with plenary power to determine affirmatively the Court's appellate
jurisdiction, there would be little room for political concern. Instead,
the Court's appellate jurisdiction was only facially outlined, with at
least facial authority in Congress to except from that jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution is the predicate for the development of the misnomered doctrine of "constitutional
causes of action" under the Fourth Amendment,' -the Fifth Amendment's due process clause,5 and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, among others.6 Substantial scholarly
commentary exists over the scope of constitutional causes of action, but
consideration of congressional limitation of that concept has been limited.7 Thus far, commentary on constitutional causes of action has not
reached the idea of excepting particular causes of action from the
Court's appellate jurisdiction as a means of regulating the causes of
action.
Debate on the jurisdictional predicate to the judicial enforcement
of constitutional rights, however, has drawn the attention of Congress
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
4. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Interest here is limited to causes and
cases arising directly under the Constitution, not correlative statutes, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1976, as amended 1980).
7. Literature concerning Bivens-type actions, for example, has consistently focused on
the scope of the remedy, not the jurisdictional predicate for the case. Presumably, jurisdiction lies only under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976, as amended 1980) in cases involving state or
federal officer defendants, and under § 1346 in suits against the United States.
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in the form of excepting from the Court's jurisdiction certain species of
cases. Since 1956, over one hundred proposals to restrict the Court's
jurisdiction can be found in the CongressionalRecord, although many
are mere reintroductions or variations of previous bills. Only three
have received serious consideration by either the House or the Senate.
The first proposal responded to a series of Court decisions curbing
some of the excesses of McCarthyism. The second proposal responded
to the reapportionment decisions.9 The third proposal focuses on the
contemporary debate concerning prayer in the public schools and the
efficacy of Engel v. Vitale10 andAbington School District v. Schempp. n
Like its predecessors, the school prayer proposal' 2 is a response to
8. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See
also S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); Limitation ofAppellate Jurisdictionof the United
States Supreme Court: Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration ofthe
InternalSecurity Act andother InternalSecurity Laws ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1957, 1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Senate Hearings];S. REP.
No. 1586, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Cf. H.R. 10775, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). S. 2646
would have removed Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases involving contempts of Congress, federal employee security separations, state "subversive activities" programs, teacher
employment and "subversive activities" control, and state bar admissions. Certain of these
exceptions would be only statutory, while others, because of the nature of the claim, could
only be characterized as constitutional. The Senate passed a modified version of the bill, but
the proposal died on a point involving its germaneness to new language in a conference
committee report. See generally W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); C. PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE
SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960 (1961).
9. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See also H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. Res. 893, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110
CONG. REC. 20213-301, 21236 (1964). H.R. 11926 was introduced by Congressman Tuck in
1964 to remove all cases involving the apportionment or reapportionment of state legislatures from both the Supreme Court's and the inferior federal courts' jurisdiction. After an
acrimonious debate, the bill was passed. This bill is not as well-known as the "stay" bill
which was introduced, modified, and passed by the Senate. Both bills died in the Senate
when a move to invoke cloture on the Conference Report failed by a substantial margin.
See generally McKay, Court, Congress andReapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REv. 255 (1964).
10. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
11. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
12. On April 5, 1979, Senator Helms proposed an amendment to the Department of
Education organic bill that would remove school prayer issues from the Court's jurisdiction.
This amendment was subsequently attached to a bill that would have provided broader
discretion for the Court to handle its docket. Both were passed in the Senate, but the
Supreme Court jurisdiction bill languished in the House Judiciary Committee and died at
adjournment. See S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 3057-58 (1979). See also
Prayerin Public Schools andBuildings: HearingsBefore the Subcomrm on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, House Comm on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). At the beginning of the 97th Congress, Senator Helms and Congressman Crane
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a perceived erroneous interpretation of the Constitution by the Court.
Unlike its predecessors, however, which responded to unentrenched
and limited Court interpretations, this proposal is a reaction against the
long-term development of constitutional standards under the establishment clause. 13 Even as the school prayer proposal was being delayed
by the House Judiciary Committee near the end of the Ninety-sixth
Congress,14 the Court summarily decided Stone v. Graham, 5 which declared the display of the Ten Commandments in all Kentucky public
classrooms unconstitutional, even though it contained a statement of
secular purpose and even though it was financed by private contributions to the state treasury in accordance with state law.' 6 During the
Ninety-seventh Congress, debate on limiting the judiciary's jurisdiction
and remedial powers in abortion, busing, and school prayer cases flourished. 7 The contemporary debate is also distinguishable because it is
reintroduced the proposal. S. 481, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
13. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); New York v. Cathedral Academy,
434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Pub.
Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wheeler v. Barrera,
417 U.S. 402 (1974); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon II); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(Lemon I); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). This is not the first attempt to nullify,
alter, or obviate past decisions in this area. See School Prayers: HearingsBefore the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (constitutional amendments); School
Prayer: HearingsBefore the Subcomm on ConstitutionalAmendments of the Senate Comm
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (constitutional amendments). An attempt to
catalogue the introductions and reintroduction of constitutional amendments and simple
legislation in this. area has, in light of limited space, not been undertaken.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
16. Id. at 42-43.
17. See ConstitutionalRestraintsupon the Judiciary,HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); The Fourteenth
Amendment and School Busing, Hearings Before the Subcoma. on the Constitution of the
Comn on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1760, infra
note 19); The Human Lfe Bill, HearingsBefore the Subcommn on SeparationofPowers ofthe
Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (S. 158, infra note 19); School Desegregation, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civiland ConstitutionalRights ofthe Comm on the
Judiciary,97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). During the first half of the second session of the 97th
Congress, the Senate passed a provision to limit the remedial power of the federal courts in
school desegregation cases by prohibiting orders that would require busing pupils more than
10 miles round trip or more than 30 minutes per day beyond the nearest school that offered
the classes in which the pupil was matriculating, as part of the Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1982. S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982) (as
passed the Senate). The need to reconcile this bill with a House-approved version was obviated by the passage of a continuing resolution funding the Department of Justice for the
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part of a broader congressional debate. The school prayer proposal has
been the prototype for bills"8 to limit jurisdiction and relief in abortion
and school desegregation cases as well.' 9 Test cases will inexorably follow passage of any school prayer, abortion, or busing proposal, given
the emotion committed to their debate. Thus, Congress and the Court
may have begun in earnest to travel the road from constitutional tension to constitutional conflict.
This political history has elicited responsive, if fragmented, scholarly literature on the scope of the exceptions and regulations clause.20
remainder of the fiscal year. H.R.J. Res. 409, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Act of Mar. 31, 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-161.
18. The language of these school prayer bills, S.481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), H.R.
865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), provides an excellent legislative prototype. In order to
cover other areas of cases arising under the Constitution, only the direct object need be
changed. S.481 and H.R. 865 both provide, in pertinent part:
"§ 1259. Appellate Jurisdiction; limitations
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1253, 1254, and 1257 of this chapter the
Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or otherwise any case arising out of any State statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or any part thereof,
or arising out of any act interpreting, applying or enforcing a State statute, ordinance, rule,
or regulation, which relates to voluntary prayers in public schools and public
buildings .... "
"§ 1363. Limitations on jurisdiction
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any case or question which the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review
under section 1259 of this title." This is precisely what has been done with H.R. 869, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), a bill to limit the Supreme Court's and inferior courts' jurisdiction
over the assignment of children to public schools. See note 19 infra.
19. See, e.g., in the 97th Congress, 1st & 2d Sess. (1981): H.R. 72, 326, 408, 865, 989,
1335, 2347, 4756, S. 481, 1742 (Supreme Court and inferior courts, jurisdiction, prayer); H.R.
311, § 106 (Supreme Court, jurisdiction, prayer and qualification of teachers); H.R. 867
(Supreme and inferior courts, jurisdiction, abortion); S.583 (Supreme Court and inferior
courts, remedies, abortion); H.R. 73, 900, 3225, S.158, 1741 (inferior courts, remedies, abortion); H.R. 869 (Supreme Court and inferior courts, jurisdiction, school desegregation); H.R.
340, 761, 1079, 1180, 2047, 3332, 5200, S.528 (Supreme Court and inferior courts, remedies,
school desegregation); S.1647, 1743, 1760 (inferior courts, remedies, school desegregation).
Additional bills exist on such diverse topics as equal protection (sex discrimination) in draft
registration and habeascorpus. The classification of bills here does not necessarily coincide
with the perceptions of their authors. For example, the language of S.158, § 2, is couched in
terms of 'jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction, or
declaratory judgment," which is remedial in character, not jurisdictional. See notes 21-23
infra.
20. Berger, CongressionalContractionofFederalJurisdiction,5 Wis. L. REv. 801 (1980);
Brant,AppellateJurisdiction: CongressionalAbuseofthe Exceptions Clause, 53 On. L. REv. 3
(1973); Forkosch, The ExceptionsandRegulationsClause a/Article Ill&A Person'sConstitutionalRights: Can the Latter be Limited by CongressionalPower under the Former?,72 W.
VA. L. REv. 238 (1970); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Lenoir, CongressionalControl Over the Appellate Jurisdictionofthe Supreme Court, 5 U. KAN. L. Rev. 16 (1956); Levy,
CongressionalPowerover the Appellate Jurisdictionofthe Supreme Court: A Reappraisal,22
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In contrast, illuminating the scope of this article requires the statement
of several caveats. First, this article is concerned only with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus, contemporary bills on
inferior federal court consideration of, for example, abortion issues,

while germane to a discussion of the political context, will not be considered. The appropriate authority for the disposition of these questions is the power of Congress to ordain and establish inferior federal
courts under article III, section 1, and article I, section 8, clause 9 (the
inferior courts clause), not a power over the Supreme Court under the

exceptions and regulations clause." Second, this article addresses only
questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, issues of remedy, such
as the busing remedy and the Bivens22 damage remedy, are germane
only to contextual discussion. 23 Third, the scope of this article is limN.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 178 (1967); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Courts Appellate Jurisdiction: HistoricalBasis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1962); Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the
Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Sager, ForewordConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 229 (1973); Wechsler, The
Courtsandthe Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965); Note, Limitationson theAppellate Jurisdictionofthe Supreme Court, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 99 (1958); Comment, Removal of
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdictiorn A Weapon Against Obscenity?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 291
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Obscenity]; Comment, CongressionalPower Over Appellate
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: A Reappraisal,22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 178 (1967).
See generally Symposium on Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction, 65 JUDICATURE 177
(1981). See also Fite & Rubenstein, Curbingthe Supreme Court--StateExperiencesandFederalProposals, 35 MICH. L. REv. 762 (1937); Martig, Congress andthe Appellate Jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, 34 MICH. L. REV. 650 (1936); Nagel, Court-CurbingProposals in
American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965); Richter, A4 Legislative Curb on the Judiciary, 21 J. POL. ECON. 281 (1913); Stumpf, CongressionalResponseto Supreme Court Rulings:
The Interrelationof Law andPolitics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965). Cf. Eisenberg, Congressional
Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Estreicher,
CongressionalPower and ConstitutionalRights: Reections on Proposed "HumanLfe'Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333 (1982); Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower to Control the
Jurisdictionofthe Lower FederalCourts: A CriticalReview anda New Synthesis, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 45 (1975).
21. The inferior courts clause of article III, § 1, along with the restrictions imposed by
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, is a distinct authority, separable from the
exceptions and regulations clause of article III, § 2, clause 2, which concerns the appellate
jurisdiction of.the Supreme Court. On numerous occasions, however, the question of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction has been discussed in terms of practice consequent to the powers of the inferior courts clause. For clarity of analysis, this article is restricted to the authority establishing the Supreme Court under article III and seeks to avoid the folly of confusing
the Supreme Court with the inferior courts.
22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. Jurisdiction is a separable issue from either procedure or remedy. It must be noted,
however, that the use of jurisdiction, procedure, and remedy as means of controlling activities of the federal courts (historically in the context of inferior federal courts) has often
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ited to "exceptions" from jurisdiction. It must be remembered that the
exceptions and regulations clause has two distinct, yet interrelated,
parts and may be considered as two clauses. By the term "exception,"
it is generally understood

4

that apartis removed or excluded from the

whole, removing the entirety of that part of the whole. In the context of
constitutional claims, an exception must preclude the Court from entertaining the claim. A regulation, on the other hand, does not take away
or preclude-it merely sets order or method to the process of doing a
thing.25 Fourth, this article considers only the question of excepting

those cases in which constitutional, not merely statutory, rights are
claimed.

Although the language of the exceptions and regulations clause
does not provide any "plain meaning," several initial interpretations of
the clause are summarized here and detailed later.2 6 By linguistic mod-

ification, the reading implicit in the congressional proposals is that "the
supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. . with such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make." This reading relates the "exceptions" component directly to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
An alternative reading relates the "exceptions" component directly to
the law and fact clause. This reading might be extended to exclusivity,
ie., exceptions solely related to the law and fact clause, leaving the
jurisdiction of the Court beyond congressional action.2 7 These two

readings appear to represent polar extremes--either complete or nonblurred the distinctions between them, and, indeed, the distinctions themselves have
changed over time. For example, the provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Act of Mar.
23, 1932, ch. 229, 47 Stat. 70, which restricts the district courts from issuing injunctions in
labor disputes, was initially referred to as a jurisdictional limitation but is now referred to as
a remedial restriction. This distinction may not be important in light of the restriction of
this article to the Supreme Court, since there have been no attempts to restrict remedies
available to the Court or to limit its remedial power jurisdictionally. The analytic framework proposed is one composed of six discrete questions: (1) Supreme Court jurisdiction;
(2) Supreme Court procedure; (3) Supreme Court remedies; (4) inferior court jurisdiction;
(5) inferior court procedure; and (6) inferior court remedies. Within this framework, this
article is concerned only with question (I).
24. Modem common-sense definitions, as well as technical definitions, comport with
those of the Framers. See Ratner, supra note 20, at 168-71. There seems to be no need to
delve into the definitional development of these terms again.
25. To be oversimplistic, exceptions may be best illustrated in jurisdictional terms,
while regulations are exemplified by procedure and remedies. This illustration, however,
does not recognize that there clearly are procedural and remedial exceptions and jurisdictional regulations; further, the illustration tends to confuse the sources of congressional
power over the Supreme and inferior courts with the effects of congressional concern with
the latter. The discussion of the history of congressional consideration of the federal courts
will illustrate this complexity of ideas.
26. See text accompanying notes 212-27, infra.
27. See Merry, supra note 20.
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existent congressional authority over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Such extremes of interpretation, however, illustrate only
that diagrammatical analysis is inconclusive. A variety of middle
grounds may be derived, principally from the interplay with other
clauses of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. For example, the
exceptions and regulations clause, together with the inferior courts
clause, may be interpreted to authorize Congress to place appellate jurisdiction in inferior federal courts. 2s These clauses also may be, and
indeed have been, interpreted to authorize Congress to make the
Court's original jurisdiction concurrent with such inferior federal
courts, just as the inferior courts clause has been interpreted to allow
the original jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts to be concurrent
with the jurisdiction of state courts.29 In light of the possible multiple
readings of the exceptions and regulations clause, particularly when
read in conjunction with the inferior courts clause, the only thing that is
clear about the "plain meaning" of the exceptions and regulations
clause is that there is nothing plain at all.
Accordingly, this article is confined to the narrow question of the
validity of the interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause
that would authorize Congress to except particular constitutional
claims from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Although
there are a multitude of questions concerning the regulatory powers of
Congress, the powers over the processes and remedies available to the
Court, and the entire existence of inferior courts, this article undertakes
to explore a limited but important and volatile issue. It focuses on that
issue from several angles. First, the article stresses the conceptual
framework of the issue by examining the tensions within theories of
constitutional jurisdiction, judicial review, the doctrine of separation of
powers, and the system of checks and balances. Second, the article develops a historical perspective from the Federal Convention of 1787,
the state ratifying conventions, and the initial amendments to the Con28. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80; 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1976). Contra
546-626 (1831).

3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

29. Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnson, 111 U.S. 449 (1884); B6rs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252
(1884); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 78; 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (Supp. 1980). The
converse theory has also been proposed that Congress had authority to make cases within

the appellate jurisdiction original in the Supreme Court. See generally HearingsBe/ore the
Subcomm. on Separation o/Powers fthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 169-70 (1969) (testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings];Van
Alstyne,.4 CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 30-33; Comment, Obscenity, supra note 20, at 294-95. General federal question jurisdiction naturally devolved to
the state courts of general jurisdiction by congressional omission in the organization of the
inferior federal courts.
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stitution. Third, this strain is continued with a review of the implementation of the Constitution by the Congress and the Court through the
formative period, the Great Insurrection, and the more contemporary
substantive regulation of the federal courts. Finally, the article applies

the precedents and principles discerned to the current question of the
constitutionality of excepting from the Court's appellate jurisdiction
particular classes of cases arising under the Constitution.
I.

Conceptual Framework

Underlying the political and constitutional discussion of the instant question are conceptual differences of opinion and theory. In
considering the detail of legislative and judicial interpretation under
the exceptions and regulations clause, the conceptual framework will
be a constant reference. Four concepts will be useful: constitutional
jurisdiction, the legitimacy of judicial review, the doctrine of separation
of powers, and the system of checks and balances.
The theory of constitutional jurisdiction simply suggests that the
source of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is the Constitution
itself. If the vesting of judicial power affirmatively grants jurisdiction
without action by the Congress and the President, or if it contemplates
only mandatory action by the political branches of government, a more
restrictive view of the exceptions and regulations clause of article III is
warranted than if jurisdiction is dependent on an affirmative discretionary action. If the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is not
self-executing, 1e., its source is statutory authority, some congressional
and executive action is necessary and a liberal view of the exceptions
and regulations clause would be warranted. Accepting that premise,
the next logical question is whether, and to what extent, that action is
mandatory, and thus merely ministerial.
The Constitution commences each article with an organic clause
stipulating authority and the mandatory nature of that authority, with
certain modifications based on the branch organized.3 0 From the beginning of the Federal Convention of 1787, the term jurisdiction" was
used with regard to the judiciary in the senses of both organization and
30. Compare art. I, § 1,cl. 1 and art. II, § 1, cl. 1 with art. III, § 1, cl.
I. The phrases in
articles I and II that "all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States" and "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America," compare favorably with the article III notion that "[Tihe judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court," as an affirmative organic grant.
By contrast, the organizational structure and detail of articles I and II are conspicuously
absent from article III. Those omissions have been consistently considered a delegation to
Congress of the power to reorganize the judiciaiy.

Summer 19821

POLITICS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

authority. 3' The displacement of the term 'jurisdiction" by the
broader word "power" in the organic and authority clauses 32 came in
marked stages during the Convention.33 In the major debate on the

authority of the judiciary, Doctor Johnson proposed the "arising under
this Constitution" clause, with Madison agreeing on the assumption
that the clause was limited to judicial cases and with the understanding
that the clause was self-executing.3 4 The state ratifying conventions

debated the jurisdiction of the Court in strident terms, a fact which
gives further support to the notion that the jurisdictional language was

complete. Contemporaneous external sources, such as the Federalist
Papers, also appear to have been operating under the assumption that
the Constitution itself was a grant of effective jurisdiction. 6
Be that as it may, the practice of Congress and the Court under the
Constitution has been markedly different. The First Congress, in the
31. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20 (J. Madison May 29,
1787) (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as RECORDS and accompanied by a parenthetical indicating the source, action, and date]. See 3 RECORDS 593-94 (App. C: Note on
the "Virginia Plan.") In dealing with the Records, it should be kept in mind that a compilation was not published until 1911. History has suffered greatly from its absence until that
late date. As Farrand has noted, 1 RECORDS xi-xxv, Madison's widely utilized notes are
replete with amendments made over 40 years after the fact. See note 121 infra.
32. The term 'Judicial power" is a broader term than 'jurisdiction." It encompasses not
only the authority to hear and determine cases, but a certain power over its processes deriving from the inherent power of a court, especially in a coordinate branch.
33. The first deviation from the use of 'Jurisdiction" appears in the report of the Committee on Detail as a means of providing symmetry to the organic clauses utilizing the term
"power." Compare 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 177, 185 with id at 186 (Madison, Report of
the Comm on Detail)(August 6th). In this posture, the draft organized the judiciary under
"power" and enumerated and divided the 'jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the term 'Jurisdiction" appears in both the authority subsection and the original and
appellate jurisdiction subsections. Id. Note also that the judicial authority did not include
cases "arising under" the Constitution. In the major debate on the judiciary, the style of the
authority clause beginning in § 6 of article III was changed from 'Jurisdiction" to "the judicial Power." 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 430, 431 (Madison), 425 (Journal) (Aug. 27th).
This change arguably broadened the scope of § 2 in the areas of procedure and remedies,
but it appears doubtful that this alteration was intended to be more than a stylistic change.
34. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31 at 430, 431 (Madison), 425 (Journal) (Aug. 27th), quoted
infull in text accompanying note 73 infra. The other alteration, adding cases in which the
United States was a party, further indicates that the Convention understood that the Constitution alone was the source of authority to hear and determine cases. Id. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
35. The conceptualization of the Court's jurisdiction as embodied in the Constitution
did not arise directly, but was the product of a clear debate on subordinate questions which
presumed that fact. See notes 70-85 and accompanying text infra.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 499-500 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). For a
compilation of essays questioning the efficacy of the Constitution, see THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALISTS (H. Storing ed. 1981).
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Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 vested legislative jurisdiction to hear appeals38

from the highest state courts and the inferior federal courts in many of,
but by no means all, the cases and controversies contemplated in the
Constitution. 39 The Court never has been squarely faced with the

choice of taking jurisdiction that is provided under the Constitution but
not by statutes, although Chief Justice Ellsworth,4" Chief Justice Marshall,4 and Justice Story4 2 each had occasion to support the concept in

dicta. Even as Justice Story penned his Commentaries,43 debate
on this
44
issue was in decline and has only recently been resurrected.

The historical question of constitutional jurisdiction poses a fundamental problem, however, given the lack of a concept of desuetude
in American law. If the jurisdiction of the Court flows directly from
the Constitution and remains extant though unexercised, the scope of
the exceptions and regulations clause may be interpreted more narrowly in light of the Court's mere statutory, as contrasted with constitutional, past exercise of power. On the other hand, if the question of
37. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13-14, 25, 1 Stat. 73.
38. "Appeal" is used here in the generic, nontechnical sense.
39. For example, legislative jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals from inferior federal
courts was not vested until 1891, and then only by the confluence of judicial interpretation
and subsequent legislation. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655 (providing
Supreme Court appeal in all cases of conviction of crime, the punishment of which is death,
tried before any court of the United States); In re Classen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891) (writ of error
issued by the Court where the conviction for the crime occurred before the act of March 3,
1891, but sentencing was imposed thereafter); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826
(providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court in specific cases regarding jurisdiction or
constitutionality). The gap between the constitutional jurisdiction theory and legislative
vesting has occurred only in the instance of cases arising under statutes and, indeed, was not
fully closed until 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1980), although some residual difference
may remain.
40. Chief Justice Ellsworth indicated that the Court's jurisdiction flowed directly from
the Constitution, even though this dictum appears contrary to his authorship of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (discussed at notes 14044 infra).
41. Chief Justice Marshall took a self-execution stand with regard to the original jurisdiction of the Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), but took the
contrary stand in Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313-17 (1810), suggesting that while the Constitution grants appellate jurisdiction, an exception from that jurisdiction could be inferred from a lack of statutory jurisdiction affirmatively granted-a
position consistent with the Judiciary Act of 1789. See text accompanying notes 146-50
infra.
42. Justice Story took a more radical stance on the question than did Chief Justices
Marshall or Ellsworth. He asserted not only that the Court's jurisdiction flowed directly and
completely from the Constitution, but that if Congress created inferior federal courts, those
courts as well would automatically be vested with the full panoply of constitutional jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 374 (1816).
43. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833).
44. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 20, at 23-25.
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constitutional jurisdiction has died for lack of exercise, so too may have
the power of Congress to except constitutional questions from the

Court's jurisdiction. In short, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be divorced from the question of the power of Congress under the excep-

tions and regulations clause.
The second conceptual point focuses on judicial review. Unlike
constitutional jurisdiction, the concept of judicial review has been exer-

cised by the Court on numerous occasions-sparingly at first, but more
frequently in recent years. 45 During the formative and middle periods
of constitutional history, the legitimacy of the concept was widely debated. 46 The search for evidence of the Framers' intent and under-

standing of the concept has proven to be a frustrating endeavor. The
concept was not stated explicitly in the Convention of 1787 or in the
state ratifying debates, but was implicit in the rejection of the Council
of Revision.4 7 In response to early declarations of unconstitutionality,

45. At last count, the Court had invalidated 105 acts of Congress, 908 state statutes, and
101 municipal ordinances as contrary to the Constitution. J. KILLIAN, CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION S272, S275, S291,

S293 (1972 & Supp. 1978). The first direct exercise of judicial review to void an act of
Congress was Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); the second was Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (voiding the "Missouri Compromise"). See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,furtheropinion, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (overruled by the 16th Amendment in 1913 (income taxation)); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (reversed, in part, by the 26th Amendment in 1972 (age of suffrage)). Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with J. KILLIAN, infra, at 52. Once only circumspectly applied, the doctrine now has an active role in the Court's decisions.
46. The classic works on the subject are C. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION (A. Westin ed. 1962), and Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). See also A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); E.
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION (1938); W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953). Alan Westin has compiled an extensive bibliography on the subject through 1962 in the reissue of Beard's volume. C. BEARD,
supra, at 133-49.
47. Numerous ideas were circulated during the Convention regarding the formation of
a "Council of Revision," to be composed of the President and "a convenient number of the
Judiciary," for the purpose of deciding whether congressional enactments should become
law. 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 97-98 (Madison), 109 (Pierce) (June 4th); 2 RECORDS,
supra note 31, at 71-72 (Journal), 73-80 (Madison) (July 21st). The Council of Revision
developed into the President's veto power under article I, § 7, clause 2. Madison records
Luther Martin's objection to judicial participation in the veto in this way: "And as to the
Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in their proper official character. In this character they have a negative on the laws. Join them with the Executive in
the Revision and they will have a double negative." 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 76
(Madison) (July 21st). Madison also notes, "Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought
to form a part of [a Council of Revision], as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a
power of deciding on their Constitutionality." I RECORDS, supra note 31, at 97 (Madison)
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Congress was petitioned to limit the Court's authority to review federal
and state enactments, but no formal action was ever taken to that end. 48

It is not the province of this article to debate the broad contours of the
concept, but merely to note the more limited scope of contemporary
debate. Although contemporary debate over the Court's jurisdiction is,
as before, a response to the Court's exercise of judicial review, the
thrust of the debate is currently directed toward overturning, obviating,

or circumventing the rules laid down in particular decisions.
The importance of reintroducing the idea of judicial review here is

that, while there may not be a concept of desuetude in American law,
there is clearly a concept of legitimation in American politics. While
the debate on judicial review will surely continue, the concept has been
all but fully legitimized in the structure of American government. The

proposals to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction run counter to this
strain of legitimation.
The third and fourth conceptual points are interrelated. Separa,tion of powers and the system of checks and balances must be considered respectively as methods of animating the structure of government
and of insuring the existence of liberty. While the ideas of separation
of powers and checks and balances can be traced to Plato and Aristotle,
the Framers were specifically influenced by Montesquieu's L'Esprit des
Lois.49 The doctrine of separation of powers does not demand that the

functions of each branch be completely separate from the others, but
rather that certain fundamental functions cannot be usurped from one
branch by another. 50 The concept of separation of powers has been
fleshed out by the Court in notable instances of the President exercising
(June 4th). Pierce recorded, "Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join in
the negative of a Law, because the Judges will have the expounding of those laws when they
come before them; and they will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the constitution." Id. at 109 (Pierce) (June 4th).
48. The most famous attacks were probably the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798, passed after stay laws were struck down and as Virginia's response to the Court accepting jurisdiction over Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See 1 THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1-24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as I HOLMES DEVISE]; J. GOEBEL, 1 C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 651-52 (1922).

49. C. MONTESQUIEU, L' ESPRIT DES Lois (1748).

50. As Madison posed the doctrine, "It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered
by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess,
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their
respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it
ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating,
therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative,
executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security
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a legislative function or the Congress exercising an executive function.5 1 The most notable case for the instant purpose involved a usurpation of both executive and judicial power by the Congress. 2 Proper
functioning of the doctrine of separation of powers, however, relies on
the interdependence of the various departments of government as expressed through the operation of the system of checks and balances.
The most common examples of the system of checks and balances
can be found in the division of the war powers and the spending powers-in short, the sword and the purse. In terms of its impact on the
Court, the system of checks and balances has had a very finite history.
Only on two occasions has the House attempted to impeach a sitting
justice; neither attempt was successful.5 3 The Senate has, however, rejected nominees to the Court on numerous occasions, including the rejection of John Rutledge as Chief Justice after a recess appointment
and after he had sat on two terms of the Court. 4 The rejection of a
nominee reflects more fully the tripartite nature of the federal government because rejection affects the capacity of a president to contribute
philosophy to the Court rather than creating direct conflict between
Congress and the Court. Similarly, Congress has altered the number of
justices in order to grant or to deny a president vacancies on the
Court. 5 Finally, Congress has had an impact on the Court by altering
the duties of the justices5 6 and the terms of the Court.57
for each, against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great
problem to be solved." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 48, at 343 (J. Madison).
51. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
52. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), discussed at notes 181-89 and
accompanying text infra. See generally A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 98-114 (1953).
53. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 726-63 (House), 81-676 (Senate) (1804) (attempted impeachment of Chase, J.); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., 2D SEs., FINAL REPORT
BY THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. RES.920 (1970) (proposed impeachment of Douglas, J.).
54. See J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 42-43, 385 (1953); 1 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 127-39 (1922); 1 THE HOLMES
DEVISE, supra note 48, at 748 n. 120.
55. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73 (six); Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2
Stat. 89 (five; never implemented); Act of Mar. 2, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132 (repealing Act
of Feb. 13, 1801); Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420-21 (seven); Act of Mar. 3, 1837,
ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176 (nine); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 50, 12 Stat. 794 (ten); Act of July 23,
1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209 (seven); Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44 (nine).
56. The circuit-riding duties are the best remembered changes. See generally F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSnESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-55 (1928).

57. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 1, 2 Stat. 89; Act of Mar. 2, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
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The contemporary proposals to limit the Court's jurisdiction have
clearly been conceived as a check on the Court. The perception of proponents of the contemporary debate is that the exceptions and regulations clause, besides extending to the question of jurisdictionparticularly jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution-is a
proper method for the Congress to check what Congress perceives as
improvident exercises of judicial review. Whether or not the Framers
considered this proposition as flowing from their handiwork is of utmost importance.
II.

The Constitutional History of the Exceptions and
Regulations Clause

The Federal Convention of 1787, the state ratifying conventions,
and the contemporaneous amendments to the Constitution must all be
reviewed in order to understand the purpose and intent of the exceptions and regulations clause. Little of the material presented in this
part could be considered as new, but this basic material is essential in
order to draw useful conclusions.
A. The Federal Convention of 1787
The exceptions and regulations clause is first recognizable in the
report of the Committee on Detail, but much previous discussion during the Convention animated the clause. The original Virginia Resolutions submitted by Edmund Randolph on May 29th included several
notable points: (1) more than one supreme tribunal might be established; (2) inferior courts were to be chosen by the Congress; and (3) the
jurisdiction of both of these courts was enumerated, including "questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.""8 During
the first debate, several of the specific jurisdictional clauses were stricken, and the resolution was reduced to general principle.5 9 The task of
detailing the jurisdiction of the judiciary was to be delegated to the
Committee on Detail.6 °
58. 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 21-22 (Madison: Randolph's resolutions) (Journal)
(May 29th). Particular attention should be paid to the manner in which Farrand has assembled the Records, including changes that Madison made in his notes late in life and discrepancies between recorders. Bearing that in mind, Farrand's Records remain the best, and in
many instances the only, source of information on the Constitution's development.
59. Id. at 211 (Journal), 220 (Madison) (June 12th), 232 (Madison), 231 (Journal), 233
(Yates) (June 13th). Farrand notes that Madison's entry of June 13th appears to be an
instance of Madison revising the Journal 40 years later.
60. Id. at 238 (Yates) (June 13th).
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On June 15th, William Paterson presented alternative resolutions,
called collectively the New Jersey Plan, which were based in part on
previously accepted versions of Randolph's resolutions; however the
general tenor was toward a federal league of sovereign states and a
revision of the Articles of Confederation. Paterson's resolution dealing
with the judiciary proposed that there be one supreme tribunal and that
it have a specified, limited jurisdiction, both original and appellate. 6 '
Paterson's proposal was rejected, but parts of it would later reappear.
On this scanty basis, in marked contrast to the detailed resolutions and
debates on the legislature and executive, the Committee on Detail was
erected.62
1. The Committee on Detail
Only a few documents survive to illuminate the construction of
article III within the Committee on Detail; only three appear useful.
The first document, in outline form, provides:
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general Legislature . . . and,
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as involving the national peace and harmony,...
The outline then enumerates many of the jurisdictions of article III:
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except
in Cases of Impeachmt. & those instances, in which the legislature shall make it original, and the legislature shall organize it
The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid according to
the discretion of the legislature may be assigned to the inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.3
In exercising its delegated authority, the Committee on Detail reverted
to many of the enumerations previously discussed in the Convention.
The delegation of the division of jurisdiction between the Supreme and
inferior courts is "new" in this document. At this point, the choice of
making appellate jurisdiction original and delegating trial jurisdiction
to the inferior courts is the only recognizable concern of the
Committee.
8.

61. Id. at 244 (Madison, Paterson's resolutions) (June 15th).
62. 2 id at 97 (Journal), 106 (Madison) (July 24th). The Committee on Detail was
composed of Edmund Randolph of Virginia, John Rutledge of South Carolina, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts. All of these men were involved with the later ratification and implementation of the
Constitution.
63. Id. at 146-47 (Committee on Detail, IV); 4 id at 47-49 (Corrections).
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The second document may be no more than an extract of the Paterson resolutions, but to such an extract Wilson appears to have appended a new idea: "[a]n appeal for the Correction of all Errors both
in Law and Fact."' The third document, apparently late in the Committee's work, presents a more complete picture:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme [National] Court shall extend to all Cases arising under Laws passed by the Legislature of
the United States;. . .In Cases of Impeachment, Cases affecting
Ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, this Jurisdiction shall be original.
In all the other Cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with
such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Legislature
shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the Jurisdiction above mentd.,-except the Trial of the Executive-, in the
to
Manner and under the Limitations which it shall think proper 65
such inferior Courts as it shall constitute from Time to Time.
The next-to-last sentence appears to be a new version of the predecessor language giving Congress authority to make the appellate jurisdiction original. The last sentence clearly indicates that Congress may
assign jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts. If the meaning of the
provisions overlapped, the question remains why two separable delegations were made. Thus the first appearance of the clause allows only a
narrow interpretation. The law and fact clause is also conspicuously
absent. The division of appellate jurisdiction between the Supreme
and inferior federal tribunals would appear to be a consistent interpretation to this point in development. It was also during the initial constructions of a constitution and deliberations of the Committee on
Detail that the authority to constitute inferior courts was enumerated in
the legislative article for the first time.66
The report of the Committee on Detail was the basis for future
discussion. The relevant provision of the Committee's report was in
the following terms:
Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend
to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the
United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of Officers of
the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except such
as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, and
64. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 157 & n.15 (Committee on Detail, VII).
65. Id. at 172-73 (Committee on Detail, IX).
66. Id. at 136 (Committee on Detail, III), 144 (IV), 168 (IX).
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between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In
all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with
such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature
shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of the
United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it
shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute
from time to time.67
The Convention took up the provisions of the report of the Committee on Detail seriatim. On August 17th, during debate on the powers of the legislative branch, the Convention agreed to the
establishment of inferior courts.68 An additional charge was given to
the Committee on Detail on August 20th: To consider whether "The
Jurisdiction of the supreme Court shall be extended to all controversies
between the U. S., and an individual State, or the U. S. and the Citizens
' 69
of an individual State.
2. The Debate on the Judiciary
The records of the main debate on the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, held on August 27th, pose a singular problem: Many of the
amendments are noted only in the technical linguistic sense, without
notation of discussion and debate. The first amendment added the law
and equity clause over the objection that the powers of common law
courts and chancery courts, as known at that time, should not be consolidated into a single court system. 70 After considerable debate on
what eventually became the good behavior and diminution clauses, the
Convention reached the formal questions of jurisdiction.7 1 The proposition that the United States should be able to sue in its own courts was
accepted when the Convention specifically added to the jurisdictional
67. Id. at 186 (presumably Madison's copy) (Aug. 6th). While the report is substantially the same as document IX from the Committee, it is necessary to set it out in full in
order to follow the various changes.
68. Id. at 315 (Madison) (Aug. 17th).
69. Id. at 342 (Madison), 335 (Journal) (Aug. 20th).
70. Id. at 428 (Madison), 422 (Journal) (Aug. 27th). The objection reflected the contemporary state of judicial systems while the accepted motion established the idea of perhaps the first unified court system.
71. Id. at 428-30 (Madison), 423 (Journal) (Aug. 27th). In addition, the question of
jurisdiction over impeachment of national officers was raised but postponed. Id. at 430
(Madison), 423 (Journal) (Aug. 27th). Eventually, the trial of impeachments would be
shifted to the Senate, with the Chief Justice presiding in cases of impeachment of the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:773

enumeration of controversies to which the United States was a party. 2
The next amendment considered by the Convention has created
tho most substantial debate about the scope of the federal courts' authority and is a premise to this article. As Madison reports the debate:
Docr. Johnson moved to insert the words "this Constitution
and the" before the word "laws."
Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to
extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising
Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to
cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that
Department.
The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction Viven was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.
At this point in the Convention, the exceptions and regulations clause
had been postulated by the Committee on Detail as applicable only to
statutes and past treaties. The entire jurisdictional section would soon
be brought up without discussion of the applicability of the clause.
After agreeing as to a conforming amendment on future treaties,
Secretary Jackson's Journal of the Convention (Journal) and Madison's
notes record events differently. Only the Journal records a reduplication of the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear cases in which the
United States was a party, but both the Journal and Madison's notes
agree that the Convention again postponed the impeachments clause.7 a
The Journal entries continue:
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following amendment.
"In all the other cases beforementioned original jurisdiction
shall be in the Courts of the several States but with appeal both
as to Law and fact to the courts of the United States, with such
exceptions and under such regulations, as the Legislatures shall
make."
The last motion being withdrawn,
It was moved and seconded to amend the clause to read:
72. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 430 (Madison), 423 (Journal) (Aug. 27th).
73. Id. It is also important to note that in this brief exchange, the Convention sets the
stage for the classic debates on the doctrines known under the rubric of standing, ripeness,
mootness, political questions, and advisory opinions. See generally J. KILLIAN, supra note
45, at 633-69. This mere fragment of debate also fertilizes the contemporary question of the
Court's power to independently enforce its own remedies. In this light, further study of the
remedial aspect of the "constitutional causes of action" can be found in the constitutional
history, although the Supreme Court has not consciously done so. See Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 338 (1971).
74. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 423 (Journal), 431 (Madison) (Aug. 27th).
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"In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other
cases before mentioned it shall be appellate both as to law and
fact with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make'
which passed in the affirmative
It was moved and seconded to add the following clause to the last
amendment.
"But in cases in which the United States shall be a Party the
jurisdiction shall be original or appellate as the Legislature may
direct"
(To strike out the words "original or" Ayes-6; noes-2)
which passed in the negative.7 5
This attempt to amend the report to utilize definitively the state courts
as trial courts was broader than the language being amended. It would
have delegated even cases arising under the Constitution to state courts
for trial, with an appeal to the federal court if Congress did not except
those cases from the federal jurisdiction. The amendment that the
Convention did adopt contained a narrower division of when the
Supreme Court shall have original or appellate jurisdiction, and it provided for a delegation to Congress, which, in context, would be limited
to establishing that division.
Professor Farrand has inserted a notation from the voting record
that a motion to strike the words "or original" from the last motion was
successful, but concedes that he so placed the motion "merely because
it is the only place that it seems to fit in the proceedings." 7 6 The Journal then records that the last quoted motion was defeated." That last
motion would have made explicit the delegation of authority to decide
when cases in which the United States was a party would be within the
original or appellate jurisdiction.
Madison's notes record that at some point during this debate (in
all likelihood during the consideration of the second motion, the only
motion affecting the product thus far), the Convention was confronted
with the "law-fact" and "common-civil" distinctions. Madison's notes
provide the only illumination of the debate and genesis of the question:
Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know what was meant by the
words "In all cases before mentioned it (jurisdiction) shall be appellate with such exceptions &c," whether it extended to matters
75. Id. at 424-25 (Journal) (Aug. 27th).
76. Id. at 424 & n.3 (Farrand's organization). This organizational problem will recur in
the Records, but is specifically mentioned here because there is no corroboration from
Madison's notes in this case, contrasted with such corroboration in other cases of interest.
77. Id. at 424-25 (Journal) (Aug. 27th).
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of fact as well as law-and to cases of Common as well as Civil
law.
Mr. Wilson. The Committee he believed meant facts as well
as law & Common as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the
federal Court of Appeals [under the Articles of Confederation]
had he said been so construed.
Mr. Dickinson moved to add after the word "appellate" the
words "both as to law & fact["] which was agreed to nem: con: 78
It appears implicit from the discussion that neither Morris, Wilson, nor
Dickinson saw a connection between the exceptions and regulations
clause and the "cases arising under this Constitution" language that
had previously been added. In the questions posed by Morris, the concerns were explicit; Wilson responded directly to them. The motion by
Dickinson appears to be an attempt to make the choice vested in Congress over questions of law and fact explicit, yet assumes Wilson's answer that "law" includes both common and statutory law. Dickinson's
amendment does not appear in Secretary Jackson's Journal; the defeated amendment that would have expressly authorized legislative determination of whether cases in which the United States was a party
would be original or appellate does not appear in Madison's notes.
The defeat of a motion, of course, does not carry the weight of the
passage of a motion in determining intent. The discussion of power to
except cases from the Court's jurisdiction focused on the distinctions
between law (civil and common) and fact; it did not relate to the question on which both the Journal and Madison agree-that the Convention had included cases arising under the Constitution within the ambit
of the Court's jurisdiction.
Madison's notes and Secretary Jackson's Journal are in agreement
that the next motion was to delete "The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court" and insert in lieu thereof "The Judicial Power. ' 79 In yet another inconsistency, however, the Journal records the approval of a motion deleting the phrase "this jurisdiction shall be original" and
inserting the familiar "the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction," yet no trace of the motion appears in Madison's notes.8 0
In one of the more telling negative actions, the Convention defeated a motion that would have disposed entirely of the exceptions
and regulations clause and replaced it with the affirmative: "In all the
78. Id. at 431 (Madison) (Aug. 27th).
79. Compare id at 425 (Journal) with id at 431 (Madison) (Aug. 27th). This illustrates
the vexing problem of a lack of convention on such details as capitalization, much in the
same vein as the lack of convention on punctuation, which has been illustrated continuously.
80. Id. at 425 (Journal) (Aug. 27th).
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other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in
such manner as the legislature shall direct.""' Had the motion been
accepted, the authority of Congress to regulate the method of the federal courts (both Supreme and inferior) would have been clear, and the
question of excepting from jurisdiction would have been foreclosed.
The defeat of the proposed amendment, however, ought not to be construed to foreclose exceptions from jurisdiction, even though it appears
consistent with the previous discussions of the law (civil and common)
and fact. An even more specific interpretation of this rejection flows
from the next, unanimous action of the Convention-striking from the
end of the section: "The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of the Uxited
States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think
proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to
time."8 2 The Convention's rejection of a specific delegation of power to
divide jurisdiction between the Supreme and inferior courts, of course,
cannot be cited as conclusive evidence that the Convention did not
wish the Congress to have that power; the rejection may have been
because the Convention felt it was mere surplusage. Nevertheless, the
discussion until then had been focused on jurisdiction over statutory
and common law, and this particular language was so all-inclusive that
it undoubtedly would have specifically given Congress power to divide
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution. Thus, the rejection of such language and its effect, though not conclusive of the point,
cannot be ignored. It is evidence that the Convention did not wish to
extend congressional authority over the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to cases arising under the Constitution.
The Convention continued to amend article III for the remainder
of August 27th. The Journal records the conforming addition of a law
and equity clause preceding the "arising under" language, but Madison
fails to record the motion. 3 The Journal and Madison's notes agree
that the last substantive motion of the day was the addition of cases of
"citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different
States." 4
One final amendment was made to the jurisdiction section on August 28th. In order to "prevent uncertainty" as to whether the Supreme
81. Id. at 425 (Journal), 431 (Madison) (Aug. 27th). Madison appears to have copied
this entry from the published Journal before publishing his notes.
82. Id. The language is from 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 186-87 (presumably
Madison's copy of the report of the Committee on Detail) (Aug. 6th).
83. Id. at 425 (Journal) (Aug. 27th).
84. Id. at 425 (Journal), 431 (Madison) (Aug. 27th).
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Court alone or the whole judicial power that might be created would
have appellate jurisdiction, the subject pronoun and verb of the clause
were struck and "The supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction"
was substituted." This change, in itself, can be construed as merely
conforming the style of the sentence to that of the preceding sentence
detailing the original jurisdiction of the Court. If Madison's attribution
of purpose is to be taken seriously, however, the change was a specific
delineation of the Court's jurisdiction.
The question of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court arose only one
more time before the draft constitution, as amended, was committed to
the Committee on Style, and that motion-to include land claims between the states and the United States under the treaty of peace with
Great Britain-was defeated.8 6 Professor Farrand's compilation of the
amended report provides the following text:
Sect. 3. The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases both in
law and equity arising under this Constitution and the laws of the
United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under
their authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls; to all cases of Admiralty and Maritime
Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a party, to controversies between two or more States (except such
as shall regard Territory and Jurisdiction) between a State and
citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof and
foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a
State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases beforementioned the Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact with such
exceptions
and under such regulations as the Legislature shall
87
make.
The report of the Committee on Style, while not differing markedly in
terms from its charge, made improvements on the enumeration ofjurisdiction. As to the original jurisdiction clause, the stylization was nominal, and as to the appellate jurisdiction clause, the stylization may have
been detrimental:
In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme
court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the othier cases before
mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
85. Id. at 434 (Journal), 437 (Madison) (Aug. 28th).
86. Id. at 434 (Journal), 465 (Madison) (Aug. 30th).
87. Id. at 565, 576 (Farrand's Compilation).
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both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make.8

The division of jurisdiction was complete with the exception of a return
to the archaisms of capitalization and certain punctuation styles. It is
important to reiterate that the problems of "plain meaning" are the
product of the Committee on Style, not an intentional substantive set of
amendments.8 9

One final attempt was made to include a provision for the right to
a jury in civil cases, but the motion was defeated, according to
Madison's notes, after it was suggested that the nature of a jury trial
varied among the states.90 In this form, the Constitution was approved
and forwarded to the Continental Congress, and then to the states for
ratification or rejection.
B.

The State Ratifying Conventions

The ratifying conventions in the thirteen states provided a forum
for the discussion of the Constitution and for the final decision as to
whether the proposed document would become the frame of national
government. Although in some respects the ratifying conventions provide the major explanations of the terms and meaning of the Constitution, this is not the case for the exceptions and regulations clause.
Convention debate on the clause, to the extent that it exists, is of a very
limited scope.
The explanation by Wilson, quite probably the author of the
clause, to the Pennsylvania Convention warrants substantial quotation:
In two cases the Supreme Court has original jurisdictionthat affecting ambassadors, and when a state shall be a party. It
is true it has appellate jurisdiction in more, but it will have it
under such restrictions as the Congress shall ordain. I believe
that any gentleman, possessed of experience or knowledge on this
subject, will agree that it was impossible to go further with any
safety or propriety, and that it was best left in the manner in
which it now stands.
"In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court
shall have appellatejurisdiction, both as to law andfact." The
jurisdiction as to fact may be thought improper; but those possessed of information on this head see that it is necessary. We
find it essentially necessary from the ample experience we have
had in the courts of admiralty with regard to captures. Those
gentlemen who, during the late war, had their vessels retaken,
88. Id. at 601 (Committee on Style, Madison's copy).
89. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
90. 2 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 628 (Madison) (Sept. 15th).
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know well what a poor chance they should have had when those
vessels were taken in their states and tried by juries, and in what
a situation they would have been if the Court of Appeals [under
the Articles of Confederation] had not been possessed of authority to reconsider and set aside the verdicts of those juries. Attempts were made by some of the states to destroy this power; but
it has been confirmed in every instance.
There are other cases in which it will be necessary; and will
not Congress better regulate them, as they rise from time to time,
then could have been done by the Convention? Besides, if the
regulations shall be attended with inconvenience, the Congress
can alter them as soon as discovered. But any thing done in Convention must remain unalterable but by the power of the citizens
of the United States at large.
I think these reasons will show that the powers given to the
Supreme Court are not only safe, but constitute a wise and valuable part of the system.91
This is the extent of Wilson's remarks on the subject, and these remarks
appear only in the context of the arduous debate over the need for protection of the right to a civil jury trial and appellate review of juryfound facts. General Charles Pinckney addressed the problem in similar terms before the South Carolina Ratifying Convention.92 These
two references comprise the entire recorded discussion of the exceptions and regulations clause before the state ratifying conventions of
those states participating in the ratification of the Constitution (as contrasted with states affirming the Constitution after ratification was, by
its terms, complete).93
91. 2 J.

ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-

TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 493-94 (1836) (Pa., Wilson (C), Dec. 7, 1787) [herein-

after cited as DEBATES and accompanied by a parenthetical indicating the debate cited, the
speaker, whether the speaker was a member of the Federal Convention of 1787 (indicated by
(C)), and the date of the remarks]. Over the formation of the Republic, a number of individuals played multiple roles, and it is important to stress the continuity or fragmentation of
their opinions.
92. 4 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 306-08 (S.C., C. Pinckney (C), Jan. 18, 1788).
93. There is at least a theoretical methodological concern for this strict classification of
the various State Conventions. On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state to
ratify the Constitution. 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 281 (1937 (July 2,
1788)) [hereinafter cited as Js. CONT. CONG.]; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, 141-44 (1902) [hereinafter cited as Doc. HIST.]. By the terms of article VI of the
Constitution, the ratification of New Hampshire was sufficient to make the Constitution
operative as among the states that had ratified it: Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire.
Presumably a consistent, intrinsic, constitutive history ends here. The remainder of state
convention debates would normally be treated as extrinsic aids to interpretation, similar to
after-enactment commentary. However, a number of problems were evident even at that
time. For one, New York was the seat of the Continental Congress, and the State of New
York had not yet ratified the Constitution. Virginia was also seen as politically necessary to
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The argument of need for a guarantee of a right to a jury trial in
civil cases was raised numerous times during the other state conventions. Almost invariably, the response to this argument was that the
variation of trial practice before the state courts-and within the state

court systems of law, chancery, and admiralty-would not lend to the
development of a uniform rule for the inferior federal courts and that
therefore the Congress should be free to determine and redetermine the

manner of civil trials.94 Nonetheless, the proposal found its way into
the pleadings of at least four states for amendments to the

Constitution. 95
The Virginia and North Carolina State Conventions are the most
extensively reported, and these debates illuminate a variety of concerns

about the federal judiciary. As already noted, the primary concern of
the state debates in this area was the guarantee of a civil trial by jury
and the appellate review of jury-found facts, but there are also references within those debates to perceived problems regarding the accessibility of a centralized court, the oppressive appeals of small or frivolous
occasion, the detail of jurisdiction over a state as
claims, 96 and, on one
97
defendant.
a party
the efficacy of the new government. Virginia convened its convention on June 2, 1788, and
ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788, 3 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 1, 653. Thus, Virginia's Convention straddles the date of actual ratification of the Constitution for the relevant states, but there is no indication on the record that the Virginians were aware of that
fact. But ef id at 617-18 (Madison (C), June 24, 1788) (reference to failure if only eight
states ratify). The North Carolina Convention commenced on July 21, 1788, and neither
ratified nor rejected the Constitution prior to adjournment on Aug. 2, 1788. 4 DEBATES,
supra note 91, at 34, 251. That convention was aware before it adjourned that the question
before it was that of joining the union rather than that of ratifying the Constitution. Id. at
208 (N.C., Spaight (C), Aug. 2, 1788). Eventually, North Carolina joined the union after the
government had been formed and had become operational. Thus, while methodologic
problems are posed by including the Virginia and North Carolina debates as intrinsic aids to
interpretation, the historical circumstances appear to outweigh the difficulties of methodologic inconsistency, and those debates are therefore included.
94. 2 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 488 (Pa., Wilson (C), Dec. 7, 1787); 3 DEBATES, SUpra
note 91, at 518-20 (Va., Pendleton, June 19, 1788), 524 (Mason (C)), 534 (Madison (C)), 54042 (Henry) (June 20, 1788); 4 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 141-42 (N.C., Johnston, July 28,
1788), 146 (Iredell), 157 (Davie) (July 29, 1788), 166 (Iredell), 306-08 (S.C., Pinckney (C,
Jan. 18, 1788).
95. Massachusetts' 8th Resolution, 2 Doc. HIsT., supra note 93, at 95; New Hampshire's
7th and 8th Resolutions, Id. at 143; New York's 14th Resolution, id. at 193; Virginia's I Ith
Resolution and 14th Proposed Amendment, 3 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 653, 660-61.
96. Many of the more detailed arguments were during the North Carolina debates
which led to a decision to neither ratify nor reject. See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra note 91, at
143 (N.C., M'Dowall), 144 (Spaight (C)), 144-45 (Iredell), 147-48 (Iredell), 151 (Bloodworth), 154-55 (Spencer), 164 (Maclaine), 165-66 (Iredell), 170-71 (Iredell) (July 28, 1788).
97. In one of the more interesting colloquies, Patrick Henry claimed that a state was
subject to being hailed before the Supreme Court as a defendant; John Marshall opposed

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9-773

Patrick Henry, though not a member of the Federal Convention,
argued in a flourish of oratory to the Virginia Convention that:
(1) Civil trial by jury was abolished by neglect in drafting the Constitution; (2) Congress could not alter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under the pretense of authority of the exceptions and regulations clause
(arguing partially in the vein of the concept of constitutional jurisdiction);98 (3) such a law, being contrary to the Constitution, would be a
nullity and that judges would so declare in conformity with the concept
of judicial review;9 9 and (4) under the enumeration of original jurisdiction, a state could be hailed before the Court as a defendant."l° Marshall, also not a member of the Federal Convention, rose later to rejoin
Henry on the issue of interpretation of the exceptions and regulations
clause and argued that the clause answered his first point:
What is the meaning of the term exception? Does it not mean an
alteration and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the
Supreme Court. These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper for the interest and liberty of the people.
Who can understand this word, exception, to extend to one case
as well as the other?"0
Marshall's response to Henry is clearly founded on the expressed attitude of Henry that the clause had no effect, but Marshall's interpretation does not sweep far in the opposite direction. Marshall's particular
concern is to rebut Henry's statement on jury trials and appeals as to
fact. Marshall engaged in Henry's technique of hyperbole in reinforcing the concept of judicial review and in stating that Congress had plenary authority over the Court's jurisdiction. This becomes clearer
when Marshall continues by drawing analogy to the Virginia practice
in civil jury trials and appeals of facts." 2 Others entered limited remarks on the use of the exceptions and regulations clause for the security of civil jury trials and jury-determined facts where Congress
deemed appropriate, further supporting the limited nature of Marthis notion, saying that a state could only be a party plaintiff before the Supreme Court. 3
DEBATES, supra note 91, at 545 (Va., Henry), 555 (Va., Marshall) (June 20, 1788). See
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (1796). This
would appear to be a case of Henry winning the battle and Marshall winning the war by
changing the rules.
98. Compare 3 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 540-41 (Va., Henry June 20, 1788) with J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

supra note 28, and

notes 21-32 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
100. 3 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 540-42, 546 (Va., Henry, June 20, 1788).
101. Id. at 560 (Va., Marshall, June 20, 1788).
102. Id. at 561.
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shall's comment.10 3 Whatever the state of Marshall's and Henry's
knowledge of the proceedings of the Federal Convention, the positions
staked out at the Virginia Convention appear more rhetorical than
substantive.
The North Carolina Convention considered the question of the exceptions and regulations clause in the context of the administrative
concerns for a centralized court and the attendant problems of small or
frivolous claims, exacerbated by the concern for the right to a jury trial
in civil cases and the finality of jury-found facts."° Although these
debates were probably the best recorded of the state conventions, no
light is shed on the jurisdictional question.
The New York Convention convened and adjourned without
mentioning or interpreting the exceptions and regulations clause; however, the FederalistPapers, addressed to those delegates through a public, yet anonymous, medium, approached the subject several times.' 05
Although Hamilton had left the federal Convention before the judicial
article was discussed, his discussion of jurisdiction in essay No. 80
sounds in the Constitution alone as the source of authority and is followed by a cursory review of the clause:
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are
all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed
the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the
perfection of the system. If some partial inconvenience should
appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them
into the plan, it ought to be recollected that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions, and to
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid
objection to a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain general advantages.' 0 6
This broad approach is limited in essay No. 81 by a discussion of the
particular flaw that Hamilton perceived Congress might remedy: the
division of jurisdiction among the Supreme and inferior courts, should
the latter be established, and the question of the "abolition" of trial by
103. Id. at 546-50 (Va., Pendleton, June 20, 1788), 572-73 (Randolph (C) June 21, 1788).
104. See note 96 supra.
105. The New York Convention convened on June 17, 1788, and adjourned sine die on
July 26, 1788. 2 DEBATES, supra note 91, at 205-414. The Federalist,supra note 36, appeared in New York newspapers between October 17, 1787 and April 4, 1788, over the
famous pseudonym. Essays No. 78-85, the essays relevant here, did not appear until a publication of a second volume of collected essays on May 28, 1788.
106. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 80, at 505-06 (A. Hamilton).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[VCOL 9:773

jury in civil cases. 10 7 Language is often politically turned in the Federalist rather than legally refined, and here the broad language is limited
by its contextual discussion, and particularly by the conclusion that
Hamilton reaches:
The amount of the observations hitherto made . . . is this:
that it has been carefully restricted to those causes which are
manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national judicature;
that in the partition of this authority a very small portion of original jurisdiction has been reserved to the Supreme Court, and the
rest consigned to the subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme
Court will possess an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and
fact, in all cases referred to them, both subject to any exceptions
and regulationswhich may be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, abolish the trial by jury; and
that an ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in the national
councils will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of
the proposed judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences which have been predicted from that source.103
Hamilton's view would appear to be narrowly confined to the authority
to hear and determine, and particularly redetermine, facts found by a
jury, as well as the authority in certain cases to hear and determine
facts initially in the Supreme Court as a trial court. There is no indication that Hamilton, in a series of essays designed to indicate how narrow the respective powers of the proposed government should be in
order to better secure acceptance, needed to brush a broad picture of
legislative power over the judicial power, especially since the legislative
was considered the more controversial of the two powers to be granted.
Additionally, the responsiveness of the essays to specific complaints
about the proposed Constitution reinforces the notion that the exceptions and regulations clause was understood as a particularly narrow
authority. As in the ratifying debates, discussion of the exceptions and
regulations clause was tuned to narrow, yet major, concerns, several of
which were reconsidered and altered soon after the consummation of
the Constitution.
C.

Reconsiderations: The Seventh and Eleventh Amendments
Concern over the right to jury trials in civil cases and the finality
of jury-found facts surfaced repeatedly during the state ratifying conventions and during the ratifiers' pleas to the Continental Congress and
the First Congress for alteration of the Constitution. It is thus not surprising that the First Congress took up the question of a right to jury
107. Id. No. 81, at 512 (A. Hamilton).
108. Id. at 513-14.
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trial in civil cases almost immediately, delaying consideration of the
overall organization of the judiciary. 1 9

The ascension of the right to a jury trial in civil cases from statu-

tory to constitutional' 1 0 status made three important changes. First,

obviously, a major objection to the Constitution was laid to rest. Second, Congress relinquished a substantial amount of control over the

federal courts, a concession that, over time, has all but disappeared
with the displacement of common with statutory law. Third, control of
jury trials, at least at common law, and the review of jury findings were
vested in the courts as interpreted at that time and were thereafter frozen. Congress retained authority over statutory, admiralty, and equita-

ble proceedings, while common law questions were relegated to
common law. The Court has defined the right to ajury trial as "limited
to rights and remedies peculiarly legal in their nature, and such as it

was proper to assert in courts of law, and by the appropriate modes and
proceedings of courts of law.""'
The effect of the Seventh Amendment on the scope of the exceptions and regulations clause was finite. The concern for the right to a
jury trial in civil cases and the finality accorded jury-found facts in the
Federal Convention and the state ratifying conventions suggests that
the exceptions and regulations clause applied directly to the law and

fact clause. It has been suggested that the right to a jury trial was the
primary, if not conclusive, purpose for the exceptions and regulations
clause, and further that the Seventh Amendment obviated the excep-

tions and regulations clause completely."I 2 Congressional concern for
the mode of amendment of the Constitution may have resulted in the
109. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 443 (Madison, (C), Va.) (introducing resolutions for amendment to Constitution, June 8, 1789). See note 96 supra. Adoption of the final version of the
7th Amendment by Congress made consideration of several provisions of the bill under
consideration to reorganize the judiciary unnecessary.
110. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of common law."
111. Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1856). The right to ajury trial exists
in civil cases as it existed "under the English common law when the Amendment was
adopted." Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830). Two recent cases illustrate the breadth of the
right-a landlord/tenant case and a discrimination in rental housing case brought under
federal law: Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974). Congressional power to vest the fact-finding function under statute in an administrative body does not violate the 7th Amendment. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S.
442 (1977).
112. E.g., Merry, supra note 20.
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language of the law and fact clause not being altered and the Seventh
Amendment being appended, 1 3 but this does not stand as a barrier to
the interpretation; the substance must be considered separately from
the means used to alter the effect of the Constitution, even if the means
makes the interpretation more difficult. To suggest that Congress intended to repeal the exceptions and regulations clause interpretation of
the law and fact clause ignores the variety of other concerns evident in
the debates of the Federal Convention and the state ratifying conventions, as well as contemporaneous congressional action to regulate the
processes and remedies of the judiciary. The Seventh Amendment no
doubt altered congressional power under the exceptions and regulations clause insofar as jury trials and appellate review of facts in common law cases were concerned, but an interpretation of the amendment
that emasculates the clause entirely is not tenable.
The Seventh Amendment did not reach jurisdiction as closely as
did the Eleventh Amendment. 1 4 The exchange between Henry and
Marshall during the Virginia Convention was shortly replayed by the
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia,"I5 and within a decade by Congress and
the states. 1 6 The Eleventh Amendment may be viewed as a complex
defensive pleading because of the restriction it places on the manner in
which the Court may construe and effectuate its power. Such a construction of the Amendment is in stark contrast to the possible alternative available to Congress, namely, the elimination of the constitutional
jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine cases in which a state is
a party defendant. Still more important was the congressional approval of the amendment as a determination that it could not except
such cases from the jurisdiction of the Court by simple legislative
means. Had Congress been satisfied that a repeal of a legislative grant
or an affirmative jurisdictional exception of cases in which a state was a
party defendant would have been sufficient to overrule Chisholm, the
more onerous process of constitutional amendment would not have
113. A preliminary decision was made by Congress that the Constitution should be
amended by supplementation rather than deletion or modification of existing language. 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 743 (Aug. 13, 1789). This decision has remained in effect throughout the
history of the Republic and has contributed to numerous constitutional debates besides the
current focus of this article.
114. U.S. CONST. amend XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
The I Ith Amendment was ratified in 1795, but for reasons unknown, ratification was not
announced until 1798. See note 45 supra.
115. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
116. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30-31 (Jan. 14, 1794), 476-78 (Mar. 4, 1794) (proposed).
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been necessary. Congressional desire to put the question, once and
presumably for all time, beyond its own unratified power, much in the
vein of the Seventh Amendment, nominally militates against this
interpretation. I"7
The problem of interpretation has not been answered by the Court
or by Congress, although each for its part has recognized that the interpretive aspect is important. The interpretation of when a state is a real
party in interest has led to numerous decisions by the Court, but once it
has been ascertained that a state is the real party in interest, each case
has been dismissed for want ofjurisdiction." 8 The Court has also held
that the Eleventh Amendment is limited by other amendments.' 19
Congress' use of the rigorous course of constitutional amendment,
rather than statutory exception, suggests that Congress did not believe
it had the power to make such an exception to the Court's jurisdiction
by congressional acby statutory means. This inference is suggested
20
tions on several other occasions as well.'
D.

Lessons from the Constitutional History

The draft Constitution and its development provide one of the
classic problems of interpretation-the record as it is known today is
incomplete, inconsistent, and ambiguous. What seems clear from both
the language and the development of the Constitution is Congress'
broad authority over the inferior federal courts' jurisdiction. Less
clear, but still stated with conviction, is the authority of Congress to
decide what the scope of jurisdiction of inferior federal courts and the
Supreme Court will be with regard to particular statutory provisions,
and though not discussed in the development of the Constitution, this
would also apply to treaties, given the structure of treaties within the
law and their method of amendment by statute. Also supportable in
the history of the Convention is the notion that Congress may divide
117. The problem of ascribing legislative intent to congressional silence is perhaps insoluble. The most telling example of this problem lies in the propounding of the 14th Amend-

ment. See generally R.

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

(1969).

118. The Court will "look behind and through the nominal parties on the record, to
ascertain who were the real parties to the suit." In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 490 (1887). See
generally J. KILLIAN, supra note 45, at 1277, 1279 (collected cases).
119. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and
the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies,. . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). The limitation of one clause
by another must be intentional, however. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (equal
protection under 14th Amendment limits authority of states to control alcoholic beverages
under the 21st Amendment).
120. See note 45 supra.
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the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in terms of whether it will be
original in cases where it would otherwise be appellate, but that suggestion has not been accepted. The lack of discussion in the Convention
of 1787 on whether or not Congress should have the power to except
cases arising under the Constitution from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, particularly in light of the Convention having established the jurisdiction over such cases and having entertained multiple
considerations of statutory or common law and fact, suggests, albeit
inconclusively, that the exceptions and regulations clause was not intended to reach so far.
The state ratifying conventions reinforce the notion that detailed
problems of the right to a jury trial and appellate review of jury facts,
as well as a variety of administrative concerns about a centralized court
and procedure, animated the discussions of the exceptions and regulations clause. When jurisdiction was formally considered in the ratifying conventions, it was viewed 'as flowing directly from the
Constitution. The only limitations that the ratifiers perceived to be
within the ambit of Congress dealt with statutory and common law or
fact distinctions. It does not appear that jurisdiction over cases arising
under the Constitution was ever questioned in ratifying or acceptance
debates, nor does the concept of judicial review appear to be other than
embraced.
Finally, the first relevant modifications to the Constitution dealt
with preserving the right to jury trials in civil cases-the primary concern over the judicial article during ratification-and with limiting jurisdiction over cases to which a state was a party, a particular
construction of the judicial power. The Seventh Amendment limited
congressional power to determine the right to jury trials in common
law cases by removing that power to the judiciary in accord with the
common law. This alteration impedes only one interpretation of the
exceptions and regulations clause, and then only at common law. It
does not dispose of all exceptions and regulations clause questions.
The Eleventh Amendment restricted the construction of the judicial
power to exclude cases in which a state was defendant to an out-ofstate private party. This alteration was of very limited effect despite the
wealth of case law it has spawned. The key to interpreting the exceptions and regulations clause, however, is posed in the implicit question
of why Congress would proceed along the more difficult route of
amendment if a statutory exception would have sufficed.
In sum, the constitutional history does not support a purpose or
intent on the part of the Framers or ratifiers that the exceptions and
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regulations clause reaches questions of jurisdiction to hear cases arising
under the Constitution. The first Congresses, in amending the Constitution, also do not evidence such an intent. To the contrary, the constitutional history shows a more limited scope of congressional authority
under the exceptions and regulations clause.

III. Congress, ihe Court, and Implementation
of the Constitution
The history of the Constitution can be divided for purposes of this
article into three substantial divisions: the Formative Era, running
roughly from 1789 through the publication of the Journal,Debates, and
Madison's notes to about 1850;121 the Great Insurrection and its aftermath, running from about 1850 through about 1880; and the era of

developing substantive regulation of the federal courts, from appoximately 1880 to the present. The development during those periods of
statutory jurisdiction and decisional statements, both ex cathedra and

dicta, present a wide range of policy and constitutional views.
A.

The Formative Era

Congressional consideration of proposed amendments to the Constitution and legislation to organize the judiciary overlapped in both
time and substance. The right to a civil trial by jury and the mandate
against appellate review of facts are additions to the Constitution that
must be understood within the framework of contemporaneous congressional actions to organize and regulate the judiciary. During the
121. It should be remembered that the proceedings of the Convention were, with few
minor exceptions, held in unviolated secrecy. The Journal was committed to the President
for such disposition as the Continental Congress might deem appropriate. George Washington transferred the Journal to the Department of State in 1796, and it was published in 1819
for the first time. Yates' notes were published in a politically edited form in 1808 as an
attack on Madison and were formally published shortly after the appearance of the Journal.
Madison's voluminous and detailed, although often postured, notes were not published until
1840, after his death. Many other writings, including the drafts of the Committee on Detail,
were not assembled until Farrand published the first edition of the Aecords in 1911, or until
publication of the second edition in 1937. Farrand, Introduction to 1 RECORDS, supra note
31, at xi-xxv. These documents were preceded by both Luther Martin's Letter, 1 DEBATES,
supra note 91, at 344, and THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36. Elliot's Debates of the ratifying
conventions were compiled and first published in 1830, with a second edition issued in 1836.
The point of such publication and disclosure history-aside from its use in documenting the
personal histories of the Framers, ratifiers, members of congress, and justices during the
formative period-was that only political debate and personal recollections were available
to each writer in considering the purpose and intent of the Convention. Thus, understanding the role that each individual played in the formative era is of great value in evaluating
what that individual has said in interpreting the Constitution during that period.
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First Congress, the Senate appointed a committee to draft a bill to organize the judiciary. The bill was reported on June 12, 1789, and debate commenced on June 22nd. 122 After debate and alteration, the bill
passed the Senate and was referred to the House on July l7th.'1
Madison had proposed resolutions in the House to amend the
Constitution in June, and debate was commenced on August 14th. 24
Several amendment proposals overlapped provisions of the Senatepassed judiciary bill; consideration of the latter was therefore postponed. 125 The House agreed to amendment resolutions on August
22nd and referred them to the Senate.1 26 House consideration of the
judiciary bill was again postponed while the Senate altered the amendment resolutions. 27 Only after the Senate passed the resolutions did
the House take up the judiciary bill.' 28 The Judiciary Act of 1789 was
signed on September
24th, one week after the Bill of Rights was re129
ferred to the states.
Details of several sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789 would have
provided a useful record of legislative purpose and intent, but such
records, common to the processes under which Congress today operates, were embryonic at best in 1789.130 Warren's review of the Judiciary Act of 1789 appears to be the only attempted reconstruction of the
process, and his conclusions generally reach only the subject of the
122. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (Committee appointed, Apr. 7, 1789). 47 (bill reported, Lee,
(C), June 12, 1789). (There are two different editions of Annals of Congress. The edition
used here bears the running head "History of Congress." The other edition bears the running head "Debates in Congress." Page citations to "History" do not correspond with material in "Debates.") The Committee originally included four members of the Federal
Convention and their respective state ratifying conventions: Ellsworth of Connecticut, Paterson of New Jersey, Bassett of Delaware, and Few of Georgia.
123. Id. at 48 (debate commenced, June 22, 1789), 50 (recommitted, July 13, 1789), 51
(passed, July 17, 1789).
124. Id. at 439-40 (Va., Madison (C), June 8, 1789), 745 (debate begun, Aug. 14, 1789).
125. Id. at 685-90 (July 20-21, 1789); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 111 (1923).
126. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 808 (Aug. 24, 1789). See generally Warren, supra note 125.
127. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 812-14 (Aug. 24, 1789). See generally Warren, supra note 125.
128. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 826 (Aug. 29, 1789). See generally Warren, supra note 125.
129. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
130. For example, there was substantial debate during the early years of the Republic as
to whether the federal courts' jurisdiction extended to common law crimes. This was settled
in the negative in United States v. Hudson, 7 U.S. (11 Cranch) 32 (1807). Nevertheless,
there was argument to the contrary even after the decision. See F. SERGEANT, A DISSERTATION OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1824). Warren suggested that the Court may have been unaware of contrary legis-

lative intent to the effect that the courts were expected to exercise such jurisdiction. Warren,
supra note 125, at 51.
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newly established inferior courts' jurisdiction.' 3 ' The alteration of jurisdiction during this process has only been noted in the form of docu-

mentary changes (similar to the documentation of the Committee on
respect to the Court's appellate
Detail), but none of the changes with
1 32
significant.
be
to
appear
jurisdiction
Section 25 of the Act provides for statutory appellate jurisdiction
of the Court over judgments of state courts of last resort:
[W]here is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State,
on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of
such their validity, . . . or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the
decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially
set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said
Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a writ of error.13 3

It does not appear on the face of the statute that all constitutional
questions are included, but the Act provides for inclusion of all cases in
which the supremacy of federal law has been denied in the state court

of last resort or when a right claimed under a federal authority has
been denied, thereby including all cases in which federal constitution-

ality might be raised and not effected.' 34 Where a federal or state stat131. "The broad pro-Constitution men took the position that Congress had no power to
withhold from the Federal Courts which it should establish any of the judicial power
granted by the Constitution. On this point, they were forced to yield; for the Congress withheld from the Federal Courts much of the jurisdiction which it might have bestowed under
the Constitution. On the other hand, the narrow pro-Constitution men were anxious to give
to the Federal Courts as little jurisdiction as possible and to leave to the State Courts, in the
first instance, jurisdiction over most of the Federal questions, subject to Federal revision
through the appellate power of the United States Supreme Court. On this point, this faction
also was forced to yield. The result was a compromise." Warren, supra note 125, at 67-68.
132. See generally id.
133. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85. The provision goes on to detail the
process of review by the Supreme Court, including a requirement, in the form of a limitation, that the error assigned appear in the record below.
134. Congress appears to have been concerned with the denial of the validity of a congressional enactment, the validity of a state enactment against a claim of supremacy or constitutionality, and the denial of a personal claim or right granted under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. This suggests that Congress has seen fit to exclude
from the Court's jurisdiction, cases where supremacy and uniformity are not abridged. The
continuing concern of Congress--often manifested in the defeat of proposals to alter this
ostensibly self-executing constitutional balance-appears to lie in Congress' belief that it

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:773

ute was attacked as repugnant to the Constitution and a state court of
last resort held the statute unconstitutional, the Court would not have
jurisdiction under the first or second clause to hear a claim that a federal or state statute had been improperly declared invalid. This incompleteness was not corrected until 1914,111 but these same questions
might have been brought before the Court under the third clause on the
theory that the validation of a statute under the Constitution is a claimable denial of an equivalent constitutional right to be free of the statute. If a state were to set up a defense to such an attack on the basis of
a constitutional right under the third provision (the decision being
against that right), review in the Supreme Court is quite possible, but
this view apparently has never been tested. 36 No parallel problem existed in cases in which the United States was the defendant because the
state courts could not compel the superior authority of the United
States to appear. Thus, insofar as review of judgments of state courts
of last resort are concerned, the statute appears to provide review for
the full panoply of constitutional questions. This suggests that all cases
arising under the Constitution could have been brought to the Supreme
Court f properlypleaded or defended.
The provisions for inferior federal court jurisdiction were more
complex and posed substantial statutory exceptions, which consequently were also exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. The lack of Supreme Court jurisdiction to review circuit court
decisions on statutory questions in criminal cases prior to 1891 is the
most obvious example; 137 however, the writ of habeas corpus would lie
to review all jurisdictional questions, including all questions of the conwas fully implementing the provisions of article III. This suggestion comports with such
concepts as the independent state grounds for state court decisions, which the Court will not
review.
135. The alteration of the section was a direct result of Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201
N.Y. 271 (1911), which was perceived to be nonappealable. "Federal right had been vindicated, not denied. Under the existing appellate jurisdiction there was no way of reviewing
the Ives result by the Supreme Court. When, shortly after, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the constitutionality of a similar statute, the demand for review by the Supreme
Court was intensified by a wide-spread feeling that, in practice, constitutionality turned on
geography." F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 56, at 195. The result was Act of
Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
136. Ives, 201 N.Y. 271 (1911), posed a particularly good opportunity to make this form
of argument. The State of New York not only has an interest in the constitutionality of its
laws, but has a constitutional claim, which is not that the law violates the due process clause,
but rather that the invalidation violates the right of the state to enact laws under its police
power. Of course, this is mere speculation, for if the argument had been asserted, the results
are unreported.
137. See note 38 supra.
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13
stitutionality of the court's process. 8

More notable was a possible gap in admiralty jurisdiction, which

appears to extend not only to statutory questions, but, because of the
way the statute operated, to constitutional questions that might also
arise. Jurisdiction in admiralty cases included an escalating jurisdic-

tional amount, together with a choice of appeal or writ of error in certain cases from the district to the circuit courts, with the possibility of139a
loss of jurisdiction if counsel were to commit an error in judgment.
The fundamental difference between the writ of error and appeal illus-

trates the potential for a tactical error that could preclude taking an
138. The writ of habeas corpus is provided for by implication from the restriction on its
suspension in article 1,§ 9, clause 2 of the Constitution. Applying the English practice, § 14
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that the writ may issue to contest the authority of
confinement on a writ or other process, or the jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal
offense, but not to review the judgment of conviction by a proper court. This reading is
confirmed byExparte Bollman, 4 U.S. (8 Cranch) 75 (1807). An oft-cited dictum appears in
Chief Justice Marshall's (Va., 1st Cong.) opinion: "As preliminary to any. .. [decision] of
the merits of this motion, this court deems it proper to declare that it disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the United States." Id. at 93. This
dictum can be read as embracing the principle of constitutional jurisdiction, strictly statutory
jurisdiction or neither of these. As the Court in ExparleBollman found that it had statutory
jurisdiction, there was no need for it to determine whether jurisdiction existed otherwise.
See also United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) (via certified questions). In
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805), a conviction under indictment at common law was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
and was dismissed. On its face, the dismissal may have been the result of (1) the Court
exercising its discretion due to the unsettled nature of the common law crimes, (2) the civil
nature of the writ of error, making its pleading in a criminal case improper, or (3) the position of the circuit court as a possible article I court under the territory clause of § 8, clause
17. See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 56, at 10920; Ratner, supra note 20, at 195-201.
139. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 grants the district courts, exclusive of the state
courts, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over waters accessible from the ocean by ships of
10 tons loaded. Section 21 of the Act provides that an appeal will lie from final judgments of
the district courts in admiralty and maritime cases where the amount in controversy exceeds
$300. It is not clear whether a writ of error would lie in cases exceeding $50, but not exceeding $300, under the general civil actions provisions of § 22. Section 22 also provides the
Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review by writ of error cases in which the circuit court
had issued a writ of error and the amount controverted exceeded $2000. There does not
appear to be a specific jurisdictional provision for the Supreme Court to hear admiralty
cases other than by way of general civil cases. Thus, if the navigability jurisdictional requirement is met, (1) district court decisions in which the amount controverted does not
exceed $50 are final, (2) decisions in which the amount controverted exceeds $50 but not
$300 might have been reviewable by the circuit court by way of writ of error, and (3) decisions in which the controverted amount exceeds $300 may be taken to the circuit court by
writ of error or appeal. If the appeal route is chosen, there is apparently no further review
possible in the Supreme Court. There appears to be no distinction whether the question
raised is one of treaty, of statute, or of constitutional magnitude.
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admiralty case to the Supreme Court. That difference is described by
40
Chief Justice Ellsworth in Wiscart v. D4uchey:"
An appeal is a process of civil law origin, and removes a cause
entirely; subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and retrial: but a writ of error is a process of common law origin, and it
removes nothing for re-examination but the law. Does
the Stat14
ute observe this obvious distinction? I think it does.
The jurisdictional amount is a product of the recurrent problem of appellate review of facts. Even here, there is no express exception from
the Court's appellate jurisdiction of cases arising under the Constitution, but only of cases in which particular sums have not been alleged
or proven, or in which the tactical decisions of counsel have been

erroneous. 142
Wiscart, a diversity rather than an admiralty case, was the first of
many cases in which the Court has discussed its appellate jurisdiction.
Wiscart involved an equity suit to enforce a judgment against petitioner to compel transfer of title. After the equity decree, Wiscart appears to have transferred the real estate and other effects that could
have been used to satisfy the judgment. D'Auchey acquired a judgment in the circuit court, and Wiscart petitioned the Supreme Court by
writ of error, appending the decree and a statement of fact from the
court below. The issue for decision was whether such a statement of
fact was conclusive as to its contents, and, although its relevancy is unclear, whether such a statement is conclusive when the evidence is attached. Answering both points in the affirmative and providing for
Judge Wilson's dissent on the latter point, Chief Justice Ellsworth
stated:
The constitution, distributing the judicial power of the
United States, vests in the Supreme Court, an original as well as
an appellate jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction, however, is
confined to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. In all
other cases, only an appellate jurisdiction is given to the court;
and even the appellate jurisdiction is, likewise, qualified; inasmuch as it is given "with such exceptions . . . as the Congress
shall make." Here then, is the ground, and the only ground, on
which we can sustain an appeal. If Congress has provided no
rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate
jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it.
140. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796).
141. Id. at 327.
142. For example, failure to plead the jurisdictional amount in the inferior court was
fatal to review by writ of habeas corpus. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847).
Barry is also noted for its dicta on jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
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The question, therefore, on the constitutional point of an appellate jurisdiction, is simply, whether Congress has established any
rule for regulating its exercise? 143
Chief Justice Ellsworth went on to distinguish the civil law appeal from
the common law writ of error, as well as admiralty from civil actions.
He then returned to the regulation of appellate jurisdiction:
It is observed, that a writ of error is a process more limited in
its effects than an appeal: but whatever may be the operation, if
an appellate jurisdiction can only be exercised by this court conformably to such regulations as are made by the Congress, and if
Congress has prescribed a writ of error, and no other mode, by
which it can be exercised, still, I say, we are bound to pursue that
mode, and can neither make, nor adopt another. The law may,
indeed, be improper and inconvenient; but it is of more importance, for a judicial determination, to ascertain what the law is,
than to speculate upon what it ought to be.144
Chief Justice Ellsworth's experience with the Federal Convention of
1787, the Connecticut Ratifying Convention, and the First Congress, in
which he apparently authored the Judiciary Act of 1789, led him to
conclude that the exceptions and regulations clause clearly extends
congressional control to the question of appellate review of facts, and
perhaps generally to the regulation of the Court's procedure. In Wiscart, however, the question was not one of jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, or to hear and determine a constitutional claim;
rather, the issue was the extent to which the record may be brought up
to redetermine factual background. Insofar as Wiscart involved a
question of congressional regulation of the Court's process, the Chief
Justice's remarks might appear to be ex cathedra;however, as Wiscart
did not involve the question of the Court's jurisdiction, the Chief Justice was issuing mere dicta about jurisdiction.
Another important Supreme Court case of the era concerning the
original jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts contains useful statements about Supreme Court jurisdiction. Durousseau v. United
States 145 arose on a question of the scope of the jurisdiction of the District Court for New Orleans. That court had been given the same jurisdiction as the District Court for Kentucky under Section 10 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which also provided that the District Court for
Kentucky had circuit court jurisdiction. The questions before the
Court were whether the district court had jurisdiction and, if so, what
methods of review were available for decisions of that court. Marshall
143. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327 (Ellsworth, C.J. (C, Conn., 1st Cong.)).
144. Id. at 328.
145. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
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accepted the notion of the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, but then suggested that the affirmative statutory recitation of the
Court's jurisdiction worked a negative implication of exception of all
other jurisdiction, even though other jurisdiction was enumerated by
the Constitution."'4 Later in the opinion, however, Chief Justice Marshall indicated that this would be an argument of convenience, and
reached the opposite conclusion in attempting to determine the law
controlling the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and in particular
the jurisdiction of the court below:
It would be difficult to conceive an intention in the legislature to
discriminate between judgments rendered by the distnct court of
Kentucky, while exercising the powers of a district court, and
those rendered by the same court while exercising circuit powers,
when it is demonstrated that the legislature makes no distinction
146. "It is contended that the words of the constitution vest an appellate jurisdiction in
this court, which extends to every case not excepted by congress; and that if the court had
been created without an express definition or limitation of its powers, a full and complete
appellate jurisdiction would have vested in it, which must have been exercised in all cases
whatever.
"The force of this argument is perceived and admitted. Had the judicial act created the
supreme court, without defining or limiting its jurisdiction, it must have been considered as
possessing all the jurisdiction which the constitution assigns to it. The legislature would
have exercised the power it possessed of creating a supreme court as ordained by the constitution; and, in omitting to exercise the right of excepting from its constitutional powers,
would have necessarily left those powers undiminished. The appellate powers of this court
are not given by the judicial act. They are given by the constitution. But they are limited
and regulated by the judicial act, and by such other acts as have been passed on the subject.
"When the first legislature of the Union proceeded to carry the third article of the constitution into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. They have
not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms. They have not declared that the appellate power of the court shall not extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has been understood to imply a
negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.
"The spirit as well as the letter of a statute must be respected. and where the whole
context of the law demonstrates a particular intent in the legislature to effect a certain object,
some degree of implication may be called in to aid that intent.
"It is upon this principle that the court implies a legislative exception from its constitutional appellate power in the legislative affirmative description of those powers.
"Thus, a writ of error lies to the judgment of a circuit court, where the matter in controversy exceeds the value of 2,000 dollars. There is no express declaration that it will not lie
where the matter in controversy shall be of less value. But the court considers this affirmative description as manifesting the intent of the legislature to except from its appellate jurisdiction all cases decided in the circuits where the matter in controversy is of less value, and
implies negative words.
"This restriction, however, being implied by the court, and that implication being
founded on the manifest intent of the legislature, can be made only where that manifest
intent appears. It ought not to be made for the purpose of defeating the intent of the legislature." 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 313-15 (Marshall, C.J. (Va., Ist Cong.)).
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in the cases from their nature and character. Causes of which the
district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction are carried into
the circuit courts, and then become the objects of the appellate
jurisdiction of this court. It would be strange if, in a case where
the powers of the two courts are united in one court, from whose
judgment an appeal lies, causes, of which the district courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction, should be excepted from the operation of the appellate power. It would require plain words to
establish this construction. 4 7
Chief Justice Marshall went on to pose the question in an argumentative, if not rhetorical, form, but in doing so he undercut the value of his
original statement and introduced the foundation of one of the more
prominent contemporary theories on the power of Congress under the
exceptions and regulations clause:
[Can it be conceived to have been the intention of the legislature
to except, from the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, all
the causes decided in the western country, except those decided
in Kentucky? Can such an intention be thought possible? Ought
it to be inferred from ambiguous phrases?
The constitution here becomes all important. The constitution and the laws are to be construed together. It is to be recollected that the appellate powers of the supreme court are defined
in the constitution, subject to such exceptions as congress may
make. Congress has not expressly made any exceptions; but they
are implied from the intent manifested by the affirmative description of its powers. It would be repugnant to every principle of
sound construction, to imply an exception against the intent.
This question does not rest on the same principles as if there
had been an express exception to the jurisdiction of this court,
and its power, in this case, was to be implied from the intent of
the legislature. The exception is to be implied from the intent,
and there is, consequently, a much more liberal operation to be
given to the words, by which the courts of the western country
have been created.
It is believed to be the true intent of the legislature to place
those courts precisely on the footing of the court of Kentucky, in
every respect, and to subject their judgments, in the same manner, to the revision of the supreme court. Otherwise the court of
Orleans would, in fact, be a supreme court. It would possess
greater and less restricted powers than
the court of Kentucky,
14 8
which is, in terms, an inferior court.
In order to understand Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning fully, it must
be remembered that he was a member of the House of Representatives
that passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, and therefore approached the
147. Id. at 315-16.
148. Id. at 317-18.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:773

Act with noticeable prejudice. Since the Court ultimately accepted
jurisdiction in the case, however, Chief Justice Marshall's remarks on
exceptions from the Court's jurisdiction are somewhat beside the point.

Implication of an affirmative power has been accepted on a
number of occasions to justify the exercise of that power, but implication of a negative power or restriction has neither been so widely ac49 Chief Justice Marshall cited
cepted nor based on so little precedent. 1
neither congressional nor judicial precedent in Durousseau. In a conflict between express constitutional language and its negative implication, the latter may not be relied upon for the destruction of the former.

Thus, Chief Justice Marshall's conclusion that an implied exception to
jurisdiction is to be found from the affirmative statutory enumeration
of jurisdiction does not necessarily follow from the affirmative jurisdiction that he accepts under the Constitution and from the specification

of statutory jurisdiction. In any event, the question of exception from
the Court's jurisdiction was no more before Chief Justice Marshall in
Durousseau than it was before Chief Justice Ellsworth in Wiscart. The

question in Durousseau rested on jurisdiction of an inferior (and perhaps territorial) court and the consequences flowing from the determi149. The most obvious example of implication of affirmative power lies in the necessary
and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 18. The elasticity of the clause is illustrated in
Chief Justice Marshall's classic formula: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 421 (1819). The Constitution also provides substantial bases for inherent powers in each of the branches of the
government, for example, the power of Congress to investigate, Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-07 (1975); executive privilege, United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S 683, 703-13 (1974); and the inherent power of the courts to admit and disbar attorneys, Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1867). Negative power, or prohibition, is conversely more narrowly construed. For example, the power of national supremacy
has received substantial elucidation over the years, but, as Justice Black observed, no single
standard has controlled review under this power to negative: "There is not-and from the
very nature of the problem there cannot be-any rigid formula or rule which can be used as
a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This
Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the lights of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to;
occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. . . . Our primary function is to determine whether, under the
circumstances of this particular case, [a particular] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Whatever the verbiage, the ultimate test is simply stated: 'The
principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce
should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive
reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion,
or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
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nation of the inferior jurisdiction. 50
In neither case was the Court faced with an inexorable conflict
between its constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to hear cases arising
under the Constitution and an express exception from that jurisdiction
by the Congress; yet two conclusions can be drawn from Wiscart and
Durousseau. First, Congress had clearly regulated the process of the
Court, both as a statutory matter and in amendment to the Constitution. Congress had also regulated the structure and functions of the
inferior federal courts. Second, Congress did not create an exception to
jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Constitution. Language in
Wiscart and Durousseau to the contrary is mere dicta. It is possible

that statutory jurisdictional requirements may have deterred counsel
from presenting the Court with an appeal or writ of error that, though
arguably within the constitutional framework, clearly fell outside the
statutory framework. It is also possible that counsel may have been
deterred from presenting the Court with an implied exception from the
Court's jurisdiction. Those possibilities, however, do not show that the
Congress had the power to except such cases; rather, they merely con-

firm that counsel failed to raise the arguments. 5 '
In summary, the actions of Congress must be noted for what Congress did not do during the formative period. On numerous occasions,
the exercise of judicial review resulted in calls to repeal the Court's

jurisdiction or to limit it in a prescribed manner, but none of these
150. The disposition of the case on the matter of inferior court jurisdiction, while it has
obvious implications for the Court's jurisdiction, is quite independent from the latter question. True, an appellate court cannot be appellate without an inferior trial court, but at the
same time, lack of jurisdiction in the inferior court goes only to the capacity to bring the suit
below. Many of the decisions during the formative period that raise this question involve
questions of inferior court jurisdiction, particuarly questions concerning common and statutory law. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 8 U.S. (49 How.) 441 (1850) (diversity); Barry v. Mercein,
5 U.S. (46 How.) 103 (1847) (pleading jurisdictional amount in habeas corpus); Turner v.
Bank of North America, 4 U.S (4 Dall.) 8 (1799) (remarks from oral argument noted in
margin).
151. Another Supreme Court case, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), by
answering the question of the source of the Court's jurisdiction could have also answered the
underlying questions concerning the exceptions and regulations clause. The dispute in Cohens was whether a civil writ of error had been properly exercised to review Cohens' criminal conviction before a state court. While § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the
denial of any claim under the Constitution to be reviewed by writ of error (presumably the
case in Cohens), Chief Justice Marshall found the writ to apply only in civil cases. Counsel
for Virginia appears to have been instructed only to argue jurisdiction of the Court, but
there seems to be no record of jurisdictional argument on this point. Even so, this might be
argued to be a procedural jurisdiction rather than a substantive jurisdiction. See P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO AND H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 455-56 n.l (1973).
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measures was enacted. This most volatile period did not lead to the

establishment of precedent for congressional exertion of power over the
Court's jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Constitution. 5 '
Thus, the law and politics of the formative era of American constitutional law do not provide answers to the central question of the power
of Congress to make exceptions from the jurisdiction of the Court in
general, and to make exceptions from jurisdiction to hear cases arising

under the Constitution in particular. Despite numerous dicta of the
Court and arguments propounded in Congress during that period, congressional authority, if it exists, was neither exercised nor challenged.
In essence, whatever the basis and range of the Court's jurisdiction,
Congress enacted no legislation to except affirmatively cases arising

under the Constitution (or for that matter, any class of cases), and accordingly, the Court was never placed in the position of determining
the validity of such an exception.
B. The Great Insurrection and Its Aftermath
As the late ante-bellum period drew to a close, the relative calm
between Congress and the Court was shattered by the Court's exercise
of judicial review in DredScott v. Sandford.153 While there were ini-

tially calls for reprisal against the Court, little action was taken; how-

ever, but the course was charted toward the Great Insurrection.' 5 4 A
decade later, with the Civil War fresh within memory, the Court decided that the President could not suspend the civil courts and detain a

civilian before a military tribunal outside the actual theater of war.155

That decision, in turn, led to concern that the Court might overturn the
152. There were calls for the repeal of§ 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 almost immediately after its enactment and again in 1831, but none succeeded; nor did Congress change
the Court's statutory operation in any major way. Congress did, however, make an unsuccessful attempt to avoid federalist developments like Marbury , Madison. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 56, at 4-55; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 54, at 10-11; 2 id. at
12, 16, 123, 196-201. See generally I HOLMES DEVISE, supra note 48; 2 G. HASKINS & H.
JOHNSON, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES-FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 2 HOLMES DEVISE]. See also 3 C. WARREN, supra note 54, at 55, 57.

153. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (declaring the prohibition of slavery in the Missouri
territory unconstitutional; subsequently vitiated by § 1 of the 14th Amendment).
154. 5 C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-1864, 631-52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 5 HOLMES DEVISE]; 2 C.
WARREN, supra note 54.
155. Exparte Milligan, 4 U.S. (71 Wall.) 2 (1866). See 6 HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 18641888 (pt. 1), 182-252 (C. Fairman ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 6 HOLMES DEVISE (pt. 1)]; 3
C. WARREN, supra note 54, 140-76.
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convictions of those who had conspired to kill President Lincoln. Since
four of those individuals had been executed, such an action would have
effectively branded the executions as murder. 156 Against the backdrop
of this newly heightened political tension, the Court was faced with the
petition of a violently anti-Reconstruction Vicksburg editor named
McCardle.
1.

Exparte MeCardle (I & II)
Congress set the stage for ExparteMcCardle (I & 1) 157 in Febru-

ary, 1867, by expanding the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts to better protect newly freed slaves and by providing a
right of appeal to the Supreme Court.158 In March, 1867, Congress also
established military districts for the administration of ten states and
authorized military trials to enforce Reconstruction.' 59 McCardle was
charged before such a military tribunal after publishing editorials opposing-indeed encouraging defiance of-the Reconstruction administration. Late in 1867, McCardle won his bonded release in circuit court
from military custody under the habeas corpus provisions of the 1867
Act; McCardle then took advantage of the right under the Act to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Thus, McCardle was poised to challenge military Reconstruction
by invoking the provisions of one of its sister acts. The governmentthrough counsel Lyman Trumbull-moved to dismiss the appeal for
want of jurisdiction, citing a number of technical grounds under the
1867 Act. The Court rejected these contentions and, on February 17,
1868 (MeCardle1), specifically declared its jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the provisions of the Act. 6 ° Oral argument on the merits
was commenced on March 2, 1868. Chief Justice Chase was called to
the Senate chamber to preside over the impeachment trial of President
Johnson on March 5th, while oral argument in McCradle was not concluded until March 9th.16 1 Three days later, with McCardle subjudice,
156. 6 HOLMES DavisE (pt. 1), supra note 155, at 237-39, 488-92; 3 C. WARREN, supra
note 54, at 165-66. A petition for habeas corpus was filed in 1869, and oral argument appears to have been heard, but the case was mooted by President Johnson's pardon of March
1, 1869.
157. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867) (McCardle1); 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (MeCardle
If).
158. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
159. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
160. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867).
161. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1644 (1868) (letter from Chief Justice Chase on
proceedings and oath of senators); id at 1696 (Chief Justice Chase takes chair of Court of
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the House and Senate-under the leadership of Senator Lyman Trumbull-adopted the Repealer Act, providing, in pertinent part,
That so much of the act approved February [5, 1867]

. .

. as au-

thorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the
Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals which have been
or may 162
hereafter be taken, be, and the same is, hereby
repealed.

President Johnson vetoed this Act, despite his own perilous condition
63
before the Senate, in a ringing defense of the Court, on March 25th.1
The veto was summarily overridden on March 27th." °
The Court met on March 30th at 11:00 a.m., but Chief Justice
Chase was due in the Senate to preside at the opening argument of the
trial of impeachment at 12:30 p.m. Justice Nelson presided after the
Chief Justice's departure, and the suggestion he made to counsel in another case like McCardle's was prescient: It might be better to plead
under section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.165 The Court did not opt
to make McCardle II a race with Congress to a decision; rather, they
166
suggested the need for argument on the effect of the Repealer Act.
The Court adjourned on April 6th, averting for the time any exacerbation of the situation, leaving McCardle
to his bail and the Chief Justice
167
to the trial of impeachment.

This review of history may appear stark, but further detail only
darkens the shadows of the politics of the time. Before turning to the
decision in McCardle II, one ever-controlling fact must be reiterated:
The law of the case from McCardle I was that the Court had jurisdiction under
the Act of February 5, 1867, to hear an appeal of the
68
cause. 1

Impeachment). See also 6 HOLMES DEVISE (pt. 1), supra note 155, at 455, 459; 3 C. VARBEN, supra note 54, at 165.
162. See text of Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44,passed CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2062 (1868).
163.

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2165 (1868).

164. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44. The trial of impeachment of Andrew
Johnson is set out in CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (Supp. 1868). 6 HOLMES DEVISE
(pt. 1), supra note 155, at 458-60.
165. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides for a writ of habeascorpus to be
taken in challenging the legality of confinement or the jurisdiction of the tribunal ordering
confinement. 6 HOLMES DEVISE (pt. 1), supra note 155, at 472-78.

166. 6 HOLMES DEVISE (pt. 1), supra note 155, at 472-78. There is some suggestion that
the Court could not have decided the case within this short a time period had they attempted
to do so, for the Court was continuing to sit six days each week.
167. Id.
168. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 324. The decision that the Court had jurisdiction under the Act
of 1867 is critical because of the historical inference that the further actions of Lyman Trum-
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The Court decided McCardle II on April 12, 1869, over a year
after the political intrigue generated by the Repealer Act and impeachment proceedings, making the decision almost anticlimactic. Chief
Justice Chase began by accepting two principles previously discussed:
(1) the origin of jurisdiction in the Constitution; and (2) Chief Justice
Marshall's negative inference from the statutory enumeration.169 From
these premises, Chief Justice Chase stated and answered the question
before the Court:
The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the case before us,
however, is not an inference from the affirmation of other appellate jurisdiction. It is made in terms. The provision of the Act of
1867, affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases of
habeascorpus is expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case
before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and disAnd this is not less clear upon authority than
missing the cause.
170
upon principle.
Chief Justice Chase dismissed several state authorities in the next paragraph as not on point, and went on to affirm the nonexistence of acts
after their repeal except as to transactions previously concluded. The
Chief Justice then returned to the effect of the Repealer Act on the
Court's jurisdiction:
It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to
pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisdiction
of the appeal; and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that
which the Constitution and the laws confer.
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing Act in question, that the whole appellate power of the
court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is in error.
The Act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases
but appeals from Circuit Courts under the Act of 1867. It does
bull, as Senator, were specifically designed to derogate that decision by removing the jurisdictional act. Indeed, the Repealer Act reads more like a judicial order than legislation.
169. See notes 146-50 supra.
170. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513-14.
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exercised.1 7'

At this point, the Court reached its conclusion, with no dissent: "The
appeal of the172petitioner in this case must be dismissed for want of

jurisdiction."'

Three critical questions must be answered about McCardle I:
(1) whether or not the Court had jurisdiction as pleaded; (2) whether or
not the Repealer Act was an exception from cases arising under the

Constitution or a regulation of the procedure for review; and
(3) whether or not an exception or regulation can be made applicable to
a case sub judice.
The question before the Court in McCardle I was one ofjurisdiction over the particular case. McCardle based his case on the Act of

February 5, 1867, and prosecuted it throughout under the aegis of the
Act. His plea to the Court appears to harbor no alternative source of
jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional attack in McCardle I was based
solely on that Act.173 Thus, when the Court held that it had jurisdic-

tion under the Act of February 5, 1867, it did more than affirm its
power under that Act-it also limited its jurisdiction to that conferred
by the Act. The intimation of "jurisdiction previously exercised" in

McCardleII and Justice Nelson's advice to counsel in another case' 74
suggest an alternative source of jurisdiction, namely, section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides that the writ of habeas corpus
may be invoked to challenge the legality of confinement or the jurisdic-

tion of the tribunal ordering confinement. 75 Within a year, the Court
answered these intimations, in the less celebrated but equally important
case of Exparte Yerger,

76 by

declaring that section 14 was unimpaired

by the Repealer Act and remained an appropriate method of invoking
171. Id. at 515.
172. Id.
173. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 324. The government's motion to dismiss set up the law of the
case; the Court implemented that law with a narrow holding. See Brief to Resist Motion for
Judgment (undated), McCardle 11, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, at 511-12 (1868).
174. See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
175. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides:
"And be itfurther enacted, that all the before-mentioned courts of the United States,
shall have power to issue writs of scirefacias,habeascorpus, and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the
district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeascorpus for the purpose of an inquiry
into the cause of commitment.-Provided,that writs of habeascorpus shall in no case extend
to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of
the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary
to be brought into court to testify." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
176. 75 U.S. (8Wall.) 85 (1868).
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the Court's jurisdiction. Yerger stands for the narrow proposition that
the repeal of the more convenient appeal did not impair the right to
petition for the more complex and narrow writ of habeas corpus. In
short, McCardle's reliance on the right of appeal, to the exclusion of the
alternative plea for a writ of habeas corpus, was the fatal error in McCardle I that controlled the decision of McCardle I1. Dismissal in

McCardleII was for want of jurisdiction over a particular party who
pleaded under a particular statute.

77

Therefore, the conclusion that

the Court had no jurisdiction must be read narrowly and technically, as
the Court appears to have read it subsequently. The Court lacked ju-

risdiction only over the appeal taken, not necessarily over any alternative petition that could have been filed.
177. InA Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, Professor Van Alstyne asks: "Given this
consideration, should not the Court have proceeded to reach the merits [in McCardle II]
acknowledging that the technical basis on which appeal had been perfected from the circuit
court had been withdrawn by Congress, but declining to reject the case in view of the existing alternative basis for retaining jurisdiction as confirmed by section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789? In favor of this result it might be observed that the Supreme Court has generally not been overly technical in holding parties to the particular source of appellate jurisdiction they have invoked." Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 247. He goes on to conclude that
the appropriate criticism of the Court is that it "simply declined, under the circumstances, to
proceed sua sponte on a different jurisdictional basis than that previously relied upon." Id.
at 254.
The only rebuttal to Van Alstyne's remark that the Court has not been "overly technical" about jurisdiction, is that the Court was in fact quite technical. At the time of McCardle
II, the perils of erroneous common law pleading were still firmly entrenched. Common law
pleadings would not become comatose for another 70 years, and they are not completely
lifeless even today. The distinctions between detinue, replevin, and assumpsit were hardly
dead in contract law of 1969, nor were the distinctions between appeal and writ of error lost.
See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881). Professor Van Alstyne cites contemporary authority (28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1976)), for the proposition that the Court may consider appeals
improvidently taken as petitions for writs of certiorari. However, this authority was not
added until the famous Judge's Bill of 1925. Judicial Code of 1911, § 237(c), amended by
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 937, 938. Even this did not entirely do away with
the problem of prejudicial pleadings between the statutory appeal and the common law
writs of certiorari or error. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 56, at 285 n. 114.
It was not until Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the modem merger of
law and equity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 645-766 (effective Sept. 16,
1938), that the decline of common law pleading in the federal courts became irreversible. In
some states today, the problem of prejudicial pleading still exists.
Thus, the criticism that Van Alstyne feels is appropriate does not meet its mark; the
Court could not consistently have accepted jurisdiction other than as had been pleaded. The
ascendency of the radical Reconstruction Congress and the trial of impeachment being held
just steps away, while certainly no justification for shirking judicial duty, may have reinforced the Court's resolve not to depart from an established practice. Nor can the result be
said to have been unjust to the petitioner. He was then on bail, and the dismissal did not
prejudice his capacity to file the suggested habeas corpus petition, nor did it recommit him to
the custody of military authority.
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The answer to the second question has already been suggested.
Even after the Repealer Act had become law, there remained alternative jurisdiction by way of petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 17 8 and
Congress is presumed to have been fully aware of that legal fact. The
language of the Repealer Act itself-"so much of the Act" under which
the appeal was taken-was narrowly and precisely drawn by the government's counsel to fit the appeal of McCardle, an appeal "which ha[s]
been or may hereafter be taken."' 179 Thus, McCardle II cannot be
fairly judged to be an exception to the Court's jurisdiction; rather, it
must be regarded as a regulation of the Court's process.
Finally, the question of legislative timing of the change in the regulation of the Court's process must be considered. The Court's disposition of McCardle II, in which it respected a statutory change in the
fabric of the law while an affectpd case was sub judice, emphatically
stands for the proposition that there is nothing sacred about the intonation that the "case is submitted" at the close of oral argument. If nothing else, McCardle II settles the power of Congress to alter the
premises of a case right up to the time the case is decided.
Thus, for all that MeCardle1I is thought to settle, it actually settles
very little. Historically, to paraphrase Professor Hart's "Dialogue,"
McCardleII has been read for all that it might be worth rather than for
the least that it must be worth. 180 Under the concept of ratio decidendi,
the least that it must be worth is the narrow rule of the case discussed
above.
2

United States v. Klein

In determining the scope of exceptions that Congress may make in
the Court's appellate jurisdiction, McCardle11 has limited value and is
perhaps overshadowed by United States v. Klein.' 8 ' Klein is the product of a long and complex legal travail over the effect of presidential
pardons on the right to the return of property confiscated during the
Great Insurrection.' 82 In 1870, Congress responded to the travail by
178. See note 177 supra.
179. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
180. Hart, supra note 20, at 1364-65.
181. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Greater background on the Aein case can be found
in 6 HOLMES DEVISE (pt. 1), supra note 155, at 840-48.
182. In 1862, Congress had authorized confiscation of the property of all persons in rebellion. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. xx, § 5, 12 Stat. 589. The act also "authorized" the President to issue pardons (an unnecessary action in light of the plenary authority of article II,
§ 2, clause 1, of the Constitution). In Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867),
the Court held that a presidential pardon had the effect of not only relieving the punishment
for an offense, but obliterating the guilt as well, "so that in the eye of the law the offender is
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enacting the "Drake proviso," which provided that (1) evidence of a
pardon was not admissible in the Court of Claims to support any claim
against the United States; (2) a recitation in a pardon that the claimant
had taken part in the insurrection was to be treated as conclusive proof
of disloyalty, and thus bar the return of confiscated property; (3) if already in evidence, a pardon was not to be considered by the Court of
Claims or by the Supreme Court, except to prove disloyalty; and (4) the
Court of Claims and the Supreme Court were to dismiss any pending
83
The Reconclaims based on such a pardonfor want ofjurisdiction.1
struction Congress apparently considered the decision in McCardle II
to be a victQry, for the Drake proviso had a far broader effect. On
December 22, 1870, the Court of Claims held that Wilson, Klein's decedent, had been absolved of any offenses or disloyalties by the amnesty oath he had executed. The holding conformed with previous
but was contrary to the express requireSupreme Court interpretations
84
ments of the Drake proviso.1
The Court was thus caught on the horns of a dilemma, with the
pardoning power on one hand and what facially appears to be an exception on the other. While the opinion of the Court in Klein leaves
much to be desired, its path is clear. After the incantation of the familiar dicta regarding congressional power over inferior court jurisdiction
and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, Chief Justice Chase addressed his Scylla and Charybdis: "But the language of the proviso
shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction
except as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is to
deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court
had adjudged them to have."18 5 Chief Justice Chase went on to outline
the requirements of the Drake proviso, and continued:
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations
to the appellate power.
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain
facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has
ceased, by dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule
for the decision of a cause in a particular way? In the case before
as innocent as if he had never committed the offence." Given that the President's pardons
had all provided for the restoration of confiscated property, the Court, in United States v.
Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870), held that a claimant under such a pardon was entitled to his property. Congress intervened with the "Drake proviso," which was attached to
an appropriation authorization statute.
183. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235.
184. 4 Ct. Cl. 559 (1870).
185. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
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us, the Court of Claims has rendered judgment for the claimant
and an appeal has been taken to this court. We are directed to
dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be affirmed,
because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants.
Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to
decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that
the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial
86 Department of the government in cases pending before it?'
Chief Justice Chase was posing rhetorical questions in light of the
conclusion reached by the Court. After distinguishing cases of congressional alteration of decisions where the power to alter the effect of the
decision was otherwise within its province, the Court concluded, "We
must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power.'" 7 Were this the only
question before the Court, the result would make it clear that Congress
could not except cases arising under the Constitution in which the government was the party defendant and the statutory exception conclusively favored the government's litigative position. However, the
Drake proviso also deprived the President's pardon of efficacy, so that
another conclusion could be independently reached: "The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive."'8 8
Thus, Klein cannot be said to stand for the proposition that Congress
cannot except cases from the jurisdiction of the Court because the basis
for the exception was held substantively invalid. Moreover, the effect
of the exception was to impose a particular rule of decision that was
conclusive in the government's favor. Since the Court did not treat
these issues as separable, even though they would appear to be separable, there is no clear ratio decidendi for Klein.
Just as McCardle II proved too little, Klein may have proved too
much. What would otherwise have been a clear exception from the
Court's jurisdiction was clouded by the manner of the exception's implementation-a biased rule of decision. Klein, however, is instructive
of how cases arising under the Constitution will be viewed. These cases
will inexorably pit a right or power under the Constitution against the
power of Congress under the exceptions and regulations clause. In
Klein, the right conferred by a presidential pardon was raised against
the Reconstruction Congress' attempt to deny the Court's jurisdiction
to effectuate that pardon. This clear conflict is clouded by the require186. Id. at 146.
187. Id. at 147.
188. Id.
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ment that the Court find a state of facts and dismiss after finding that
state of facts, a rule of decision that does violence to the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, Klein does not stand for the proposition
that there are limits on the power of Congress to make exceptions, but
for the broader proposition that Congress may not violate the principles of separation of powers to accomplish a forbidden act by casting
legislation in terms of the Court's jurisdiction.18 9
The attention of Congress and the Court slowly turned away from
the constitutional fencing that left both weary and neither victorious.
The question of the scope of congressional authority to make exceptions from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction remained in
flux.' 90 In its haste to rein the Court, the Reconstruction Congress may
politically have succeeded, but legally have failed. McCardleII stands
for the proposition that Congress, by repealing a statute, may reach
into the Court's conference to excise a case that is dependent on that
statute. Yerger stands for the proposition that Congress must leave no
residuum of jurisdictions if it is ever to make an exception that will be
free of a litigable alternative. Klein stands for the proposition that the
Congress may not direct decisional results in the effectuation of its
powers over the jurisdiction of the Court. Where the limits imposed by
statute dispose of the merits of the case, Klein clearly indicates that the
statute cannot stand. Even these holdings, however, were subject to
further elucidation in the following century. The debate since that time
has been relatively tame, and the acts of Congress that set McCardle,
Yerger, and Klein in motion precipitated the last truly critical bouts of
constitutional sparring.
C. The Developing Substantive Regulation of the Federal Courts

For the last century, the Court has undergone a series of philosophical and personal clashes, but the fundamental power of the Court
itself has not again been raised. Prior to the outset of the contemporary
debates, two formidable periods of conflict took place: (1) the clash
between substantive due process and the progressive movement early
in the twentieth century; and (2) Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan. Otheiwise, little effort has been made to curb the Supreme Court
or to alter its power substantially. The Court, for its part, has continued to comment only in the vein of dicta.
189. Id.
190. Further dicta deferential to Congress can be found in The Francis Wright, 105 U.S.
381 (1881); Daniels v. Railroad Co., 3 U.S (70 Wall.) 250 (1865).
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The progressive era of the early twentieth century led to a variety
of social legislation, much of which, to the disgruntlement of its proponents, was struck down by state courts of last resort. During this period, the Supreme Court was perceived as unable to review these
decisions because its statutory jurisdiction did not extend to cases in
which a state court of last resort had declared a state statute unconstitutional' 91 The predicament was sharply focused when the New York
Court of Appeals struck down a workmen's compensation law and the
Supreme Court of Oregon upheld a similar law.' 92 The end result of
this conflict-over which the Supreme Court held statutory jurisdiction
to review only the Oregon decision of constitutionality-was the expansion of statutory jurisdiction. 9 3 During this period, the recall of
both judicial decisions and judges was advocated, but no action was
taken.' 9 4 With the exception of the expansion of statutory jurisdiction,
the question of the Court's jurisdiction.was not raised.
The more formidable attack on the Court came from Franklin D.
Roosevelt and his attempt to "pack" the Court. 95 The idea of altering
the size of the Court was not novel; indeed, such an idea had a history
of political use.' 9 6 Even today the Court-packing plan is not fully un-

derstood, but the substantial question of why jurisdictional exceptions,
if available, were not employed instead must be asked.' 97 Whatever
the intentions of the architects of the Court-packing plan, the idea of
excepting from the Court's jurisdiction was not raised as a congressional alternative.
Congress has passed numerous enactments restricting the jurisdiction, procedure, and available remedies of inferior federal courts over
the years.' 98 Alteration of the statutory mandates of Supreme Court
191. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 56, at 193-96.
192. Compare Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 294 (1911), with State v.
Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 195-96 (1911).
193. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
194. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 56, at 169-70. Other examples of
conflict are: Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,further opinion, 158 U.S.
429 (1895), overruled by the 16th Amendment; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
and the still-pending proposed amendment on Child Labor. See J. KILLIAN, supra note 45,
at 51-52.
195. See Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "'Court-PackingPlan,"
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 347 (P. Kurland ed. 1966).
196. See note 55 supra.
197. Compare Leuchtenburg, supra note 195, with R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 291-92 (1969).
198. E.g, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Yakus v. United States 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Laufv. E.G. Shinner Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Military Selec-
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writ jurisdiction has consisted of minor changes in wording and the
addition of omnibus remedial authority. 99 Changes in Supreme Court
statutory jurisdiction have only been expansive.
Congress also began investing varying amounts of adjudicatory
power in "article I courts" and administrative bodies during the development of the regulatory model of government.2 0 0 Corresponding restrictions on the scope of judicial review by article III courts also
became commonplace, but a new approach to the theory arose in the
dicta of the Court. The Court began to pose a new question, not one of
deference to Congress, but, as Chief Justice Hughes noted, "rather a
question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial
power." 20 ' In Crowell v. Benson the Court intimated that the adjudication of "constitutional facts"-those facts that form the predicate of a
constitutional claim-must be reviewable by an article III court.20 2
This approach has not been fully tested or explicated in the context of
congressional attempts to limit the power of the federal courts, but
should the Court hold that an article III court review of constitutional
facts is mandated, proposals that eliminate all federal court jurisdiction
over a constitutional cause of action (thus delegating final adjudication
tive Serv. Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23; NorrisLaGuardia Act, ch. 229, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
199. The writs issued-error, certiorari, and habeas corpus-historically controlled the
scope of review within the law-fact distinction, a distinction developed at common law and
occasionally changed by congressional enactment. None of these enactments removed a
writ in such a way as to preclude constitutional as opposed to statutory consideration.
200. We must distinguish here between administrative boards, article I courts, state
courts, and district and territorial courts. Delegation of adjudicatory power to administrative bodies began in earnest with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887. Such bodies-for
example, the late Board of Tax Appeals (administrative), now the United States Tax Court
(an article I court)-have long had adjudicatory powers subject to judicial review by an
article III court. State courts, on the other hand, ordinarily share concurrent jurisdiction
with inferior federal courts, and their decisions are subject to review by the Supreme Court.
The District of Columbia and territorial courts have territorial jurisdiction that is reviewable, but which depends on the power of Congress to affirmatively legislate under special
authorities of article IV, § 3, clause 2, and article I, § 3, clause 16, respectively. Seegeneraly
Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 312-15.
201. Crowe v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932).
202. Id. This approach has been further expanded in the article I courts area. In United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), the Court upheld the use of an adjunct magistrate's
fact-finding, but only if that magistrate is subject to sufficient control by an article III court.
In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 50 U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 28,
1982) (Nos. 81-150 & 81-546), the Court struck down the use of an article I judge to determine (and enter judgment on which execution could be made) state law claims pendent to a
bankruptcy matter when one of the parties objected. Marathon is reminiscent of the badly
divided decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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of such claims to state courts) would be constitutionally dubious on this
score alone. This has not yet been the case. This approach appears to
leave open the possibility that an inferior federal court might be designated to review administrative
action without the possibility of review
20 3
by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps beginning with Klein, and particularly corresponding with
the development of modem bureaucratic government, the Court has
developed a more holistic approach to constitutional decisionmaking.
More conservative dicta began to appear with regard to the exceptions
and regulations clause. The elder Justice Harlan's comment in United
States v. Bitty 2 4 illustrates this point while discussing congressional
power over jurisdiction: "[W]hat such exceptions and regulations
should be it is for Congress, in its wisdom, to establish, having of
course due regard to all the provisions of the Constitution. ' 205 Similarly, Justice Black eventually concluded that since the Constitution, in
its original form, is replete with grants of authority that may complement, converge, diverge, conffict, and even contradict, "these granted
powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the
Constitution. 20 6
Dicta with respect to the Court's jurisdiction were not limited in
the development of a more holistic approach. The constitutional origin
of jurisdiction, while it declined as a subject of dicta, saw occasional
resurgence.20 7 Statements regarding the dependence of the Court on
congressionally determined jurisdiction were guided by Justice Frankfurter's oft-cited dissent in NationalMutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co. :2o "Congress need not give this Court any appellate
power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it
may do so even while a case is sub judice.' ' 209 Justice Frankfurter ap-

pears to have stated the modem efficacy of a broad view of McCardle
II, as apparently did the younger Justice Harlan. 210 By 1962, however,
Justice Douglas, in a dissent joined by Justice Black, eschewed the McCardle II holding, whether broad or narrow, observing, "There is a
serious question whether the McCardle case could command a majority
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

But see notes 230-35 and accompanying text infra.
208 U.S. 393 (1908).
Id. at 399-400.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
See, e.g., Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898).
337 U.S. 582 (1949).
Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 117 n.8 (1952).
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view today."2 1 1 Yet again, the composition of the Court has changed,

and its present view of McCardle I1 and of the power of Congress over
its appellate jurisdiction is unclear.21 2
In conclusion, history illuminates no hard and fast rule, no distinct
contours of power, nor does it reveal a void. Like many powers and
rights under the Constitution, at this late day there remains only resort
to the structure and function of the Constitution to determine the
proper sphere of congressional action. Many of the cases here cited are
grounded on the regulation or establishment of inferior federal courts,
whatever the consequential effects these changes may have on the mannei in which a cause may reach the Supreme Court. Those cases dealing directly with the Court's appellate jurisdiction have concerned
congressional action that is regulatory in nature.
Neither constitutional history nor the manner in which the Constitution has been implemented by the Congress and the Court provides a
basis for reaching a conclusive decision on whether Congress may except classes of cases arising under the Constitution from the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Both the Congress and the Court
have suggested that the Court is wholly dependent on Congress for its
appellate jurisdiction, but Congress has never attempted to limit constitutional claims in this way. The Court, in its proper role of adjudicating only that which is properly brought before it, has not been asked
the question. In short, whether founded on regulation of constitutional
causes of action through exception of the jurisdictional predicate or as
a response to controversial or unpopular Court decisions, the proposition of excepting cases arising under the Constitution from the Court's
appellate jurisdiction is unprecedented.
IV.

Legislating and Adjudicating Exceptions of Cases Arising
Under the Constitution

The central question of legislating and adjudicating exceptions of
cases arising under the Constitution must be answered on the basis of
(1) the constitutional purpose and intent of the exceptions and regulations clause as revealed by the Federal Convention of 1787 and the
211. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Compare Justice Harlan's majority reliance on McCardle for what it did not do. Id at 56768. Justice Harlan cites MeCardle with approval even though noting that Congress' "authority is not, of course, unlimited." Id. at 568. The regulations aspect may cover much
more, however, and may perhaps extend to the regulation of the entire judicial power, but
that question is beyond the scope of this article.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 425, 427-34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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state ratifying conventions (discussed in part II), and (2) the historical
interpretations given the clause by Congress and the Court (discussed
in part III). In this part, first, the affirmative theories of interpretation
of the clause are reiterated. Second, assuming a legislative exception of
a class of cases arising under the original Constitution, an eclectic view
of the original Constitution will help to determine whether the Court is
likely to strike down the exception as unconstitutional. Finally, assuming a legislative exception of a class of cases arising under a provision
of the Bill of Rights or a right derived from another provision, a synergetic view of the Constitution is utilized to make a parallel
determination.
A. Affirmative Interpretations of the Exceptions
and Regulations Clause
Four relevant categories of affirmative interpretation and application of the exceptions and regulations clause appear to be supported by
the foregoing discussion: (1) exceptions and regulations based on the
law-fact distinction; (2) regulation of judicial process, such as procedure and remedies; (3) regulation of the division of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court, inferior federal courts, and the state court
systems; and (4) regulation, and possibly exceptions, of statutory
claims. History does not provide affirmative support for an interpretation of the power to except from jurisdiction to hear cases arising under
the Constitution or constitutional claims.
The law-fact distinction animated much of the discussion of the
exceptions and regulations clause during the construction, ratification,
and implementation of the Constitution. The intention of the Framers
was clearly to delegate the determination of the availability of civil jury
trials and the finality of jury-found facts to the Congress, but this reliance on future determination was insufficient for the ratifiers. Thus,
the First Congress, supported by the state legislatures' ratifications,
constitutionalized the finality of jury-found facts on appeal and the
common law right to a jury trial in controversies involving more than
twenty dollars.21 3 Limiting the exceptions and regulations clause to
delegating the law-fact controversy to Congress has the appeal of simplicity, but simplicity merely obfuscates underlying concerns.' 4
213. U.S. CONST. amend. VII, discussed at notes 109-12 and accompanying text supra.
214. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 197, at 286-87; Merry, supra note 20, at 68-69.
Although the Federal Convention may have been satisfied with Wilson's explanation of the
exceptions and regulations clause, supra note 78, the issue arose in several contexts, including the variations discussed in both the federal convention and the state ratifying
conventions.

Summer 19821

POLITICS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Procedure and remedies were another major focus of the Convention of 1787 and the state ratifying conventions and were a considered
part of the exceptions and regulations clause insurance against any "inconveniences" that might arise."15 While many enactments of Congress confirmed the common law, equity, and admiralty practice of the
times, there were specific procedures provided by Congress that were

indigenous to the new system of government.2 6 While not germane to

this discussion, the circuit-riding duties of the justices to the statutory
enactment of civil, criminal, and appellate rules of procedure until the
1930's, and beyond, exhibit this interpretation. Legislation to regulate
remedies under statutes of the Supreme and infeior courts also is
clearly constitutional.217 Any constitutional limitations on this regulatory, and possibly excepting, power are the subject of a separate debate
of great magnitude. 1 8
219
The divisions of jurisdiction between federal and state courts,
and between the Supreme and inferior federal courts, 220 pose substantial possibilities for interpretation of the exceptions and regulations
clause. First, unless precluded by Congress, the state courts naturally
have, and commonly exercise, general jurisdiction to hear and determine federal questions of law between private parties and that State, or
even another state, but not between private parties and the federal government.22 1 As to the choice of federal court, Congress has specifically
provided concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts of cases involving
ambassadors, and, contrary to Marbury v. Madison,22 2 the Court may
well have exercised original jurisdiction in issuing original writs of
habeas corpus when it lacked jurisdiction to review the lower federal
court's denial of that writ. 23 Whatever the potential for this line of
215. See generally notes 122-90 and accompanying text supra.
216. Perhaps the first of these indigenous procedures was the removal of cases in which
the defendant was an officer of the United States from state to federal court. Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 72, 79 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976)).
217. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 229, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
218. See notes 15 & 21 supra.
219. See notes 74 & 75 and accompanying text, supra. In essence, however, this question
was resolved by the compromise to delegate inferior courts.
220. See note 20 supra.
221. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The limitations on jurisdiction of the state courts
of one state over another are obvious. But see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The
limitation of a state court jurisdiction in cases to which the United States is a party is clear
and, where avoided by suits against an officer, such cases are removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1976).
222. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See 1969 Hearings,supra note 29; Van Alstyne, supra
note 29.
223. See note 29 supra.
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argument, it adds nothing to the question of precluding Supreme Court
jurisdiction.
The final affirmative interpretation applies the exceptions and regulations clause to all civil (tie., statutory) rights, an interpretation far
narrower than the reading implicit in current bills that "the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. . . with such exceptions. . . as
the Congress shall make." The broader interpretation appears to have
been adopted in the FederalistPapers.224 Further, it is widely argued
that this interpretation animates the holding in McCardle 11.25 Indeed, given the lack of checks other than confirmation and impeachment (which have historically proved fruitless), the interpretation
would appear to have substantial structural and political support.
True, Congress has exempted whole classes of statutory cases from review, and criminal cases generally until 1892,226 yet none of those exceptions appears to have been raised or argued to the point of a
constitutional claim. Rather, as in McCardle I and II, the exceptions
have been merely statutory.
Thus, the affirmative interpretations historically appear to reach
many of the possible combinations of exception and regulation of the
Supreme and inferior courts with respect to jurisdiction, procedure, and
remedies arising under constitutional, statutory, or common law
claims. The one subject not reached is that of exceptions to the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over constitutional claims.22 7 We must
turn, then, from history to more eclectic and synergetic legal
considerations.
B. An Eclectic View of the Original Constitution and the Limits of the
Constitutional Exceptions Theory
It is axiomatic to say that the Constitution must be read so as to be
internally consistent, at least within the framework of the original unamended Constitution. Should any of the current proposals to except
constitutional claims from the Court's jurisdiction become acts of ConTHE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, at 505. But see id at 513-14.
225. Van Alstyne, supra note 20. Contra notes 157-80 supra.
226. See, e.g., the lack of general jurisdiction to review federal criminal cases, discussed
at note 38 supra. Congress has also regulated the degree of discretion in the Court's determination of the right to review. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1) (1976) with id at § 1257 (2)
(certiorari and appeals jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over judgments of state courts).
227. It has been suggested that in order to analyze fully any distinct constitutional problem, the specific categorization of what is done is imperative. See notes 6 (constitutional/statutory), 21 (Supreme/inferior), 23 (jurisdiction/procedure/remedy) & 25
(exception/regulation) and accompanying text supra. Many of these theoretical constructions can be disposed of en bloc, such as the inferior court possibilities.

224.
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gress, such an act must initially be read as consistent with the Constitution, original and as amended, because of the presumption of

constitutionality of Acts of Congress.228 Thus, in reviewing the constitutionality of these presumably constitutional Acts, the appropriate
method may be more akin to an attack on the legislationper se. Finding no affirmative support or impregnable defense in history, we turn to
the adjudicative process.22 9
The first perceivable limitation on the exception of constitutional

cases from the Court's jurisdiction theory of the exceptions and regulations clause is the structural and functional argument of the "essential
functions" of the Supreme Court. 230 The structural aspect of the "es-

sential functions" argument lies in the concept of "one supreme Court"
as the body to insure the functional aspect, the uniformity and the

supremacy of federal law-particularly the Constitution.
It should be recalled that the delegates to the Convention of 1787
generally agreed early in the proceedings to the idea that there should

be a Supreme Court.23 Under the Constitution, little time elapsed until Supreme Court dicta on the role of the Court began to appear.
Durousseau, clearly a case on lower (even article I, territorial) court
jurisdiction of the District Court for Louisiana, presented Chief Justice
Marshall with an occasion for comment on the structure and function
of the Court under the Constitution, but Marshall's argument that to
228. A presumption of the constitutionality of a congressional enactment may effectively
range from a mere catchword for the burden of going forward, to a nearly irrebuttable presumption, where persuasion may be futile (e.g., in an area in which the legislative ambit is
substantively within the political arena). See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 21520 (1960).
229. It should be kept in mind that the Court will initially postpone jurisdiction over the
merits in order to determine its jurisdiction where a question ofjurisdictionper se such as
this is apparent. This practice is necessary for the elucidation of the jurisdiction of the Court
in any sense where the Court determines that it does not have jurisdiction. In essence, this
jurisdiction is "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction."
According to contemporary Supreme Court practice, in cases brought by way of appeal,
the appropriate order would be to postpone the question of jurisdiction to the hearing'on the
merits. Sup. CT. R. 16 (as amended Nov. 18, 1980). In the case of a petition for a statutory
or common law writ of certiorari, the Court would necessarily grant certiorari and dismiss
the writ as improvidently granted if the Court later determined a want of jurisdiction. Sup.
CT. R. 17. In the case ofjurisdiction of certified questions, the Court may simply dismiss the
matter. Sup. CT. R. 25.2.
230. The origin of the caption for this theory may be traced to Ableman v. Booth, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). See note 238 and accompanying text infra.
23 1. In the Virginia Resolutions presented by Randolph, the question of whether there
should be one or more such courts was left undecided. I RECORDS, supra note 31, at 21-22
(Madison) (May 29th). The alternate resolutions proposed by Paterson on behalf of the
New Jersey delegation settled on a "supreme Tribunal." 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 244
(Madison) (June 15th).
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allow no appeal from the district court would arrogate that court to a
"supreme" court is mere dicta.232 The fundamental problem with a
structural approach,233 of course, remains that there are numerous historical instances in which inferior federal courts have been the final

arbiters of at least statutory questions.234 In review of state court decisions, however, the Supreme Court has always enjoyed statutory juris-

diction to review any judgment that upheld a state action against a
challenge of repugnancy to the Constitution or federal law.2 35 In the
limited sphere of the constitutional questions, therefore, the structural
approach has historical legitimacy.
The rationale for a structurally supreme tribunal was voiced in the
Convention of 1787 as being the need for uniformity of both interpretation and judgment as to federal law.236 Chief Justice Marshall carried
the theme forward in Cohens v. Virginia:
[T]he necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness [of decision]
in expounding the constitution and laws of the United States,
would itself suggest the propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the last resort, all cases in which
they are involved ....
[The Framers] declare, that in such cases, the Supreme
Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction. Nothing seems to be
given which would justify the withdrawal of a judgment rendered
in a State Court, on the constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, from this appellate jurisdiction.2 37
Thus, Chief Justice Marshall embraced both the structural and func-

tional aspects of the "essential functions" approach. It was Chief Justice Taney in.Abelman v. Booth, however, who joined these two aspects
with the requirements of the supremacy clause:
232. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
233. A structural approach has been used in the context of a proposed National Court of
Appeals. See, e..g, Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC 14 (Feb. 10, 1973);
Gressman, The Constitution v. The Freund Report, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 960-70
(1973).
234. See notes 38 (general federal question jurisdiction in inferior courts) & 39 (general
jurisdiction to review criminal cases in Supreme Court) supra.
235. At a minimum, all substantial claims of unconstitutionality in a state action could
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)).
236. Even the staunch states' rights advocate, John Rutledge, is reported by Madison as
suggesting: "[T]he State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the
first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure
the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts .....
I RECORDS. supra note 31, at 124
(Madison) (June 31st).
237. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416-17 (1822).
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But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could
not peacefully be maintained, unless it was clothed with judicial
power, equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution;
for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting
decisions would unavoidably take place. . . [a]nd the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers
granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different
interpretations in different States, and the Government of the
United States would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very
existence as a Government, that. . . a tribunal should be established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, whether in a State
court or a court of the United States, should be finally and conclusively decided . . . . And it is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was
deemed essential to secure the independence and supremacy of
the General Government in the sphere of action assigned to it; to
make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform,
and the same in every State . . 238
The use of the supremacy clause as the binding force is a complementary interpretation to that of the finality of judicial review, but is clearly
antithetical to allowing use of the exceptions and regulations clause to
relegate certain constitutional decisions to finality in state courts.23 9
238. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 517-18 (1858). Uniformity is specifically mentioned as a requirement in the constitutional grants of power to Congress over naturalization and bankruptcy law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The "imperative demand [for] a single uniform
rule" as contrasted with "that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities" has
enlivened much of the judicial interpretation of the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3, in instances in which Congress has not acted. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 319 (1851). Instances in which the Court has required uniform minimum standards of affirmative conduct are also clear. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981) (application of equal protection standards by state court); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975) (confessions during detention; state court may impose a higher standard
of conduct or more stringent limitation of use than required as a matter of state law, but not
as a matter of constitutional interpretation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court's decision to grant certiorari is also stimulated by a concern for the uniformity of federal law. Sup. CT. R. 17.1(a) (effective June 30,
1980, as amended). Thus, the root of uniformity in American constitutional jurisprudence is
far deeper than the suggestion in the above text would indicate.
239. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, has been the source of the doctrinal
development of "preemption" of state authority by federal authority. The exact contours
are not ascertainable. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (Black, J., for the Court).
As we have noted, finality is now beyond peradventure, with perhaps one exception-the
commerce clause. Finality of judgments of the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of
a state regulation of interstate commerce are constantly subject to alteration by Congress.
For example, the affirmance of the constitutionality of a Montana coal severance tax, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), may be preempted by congressional prohibition of such a tax under the commerce clause. Also, the invalidation of an
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It was on this foundation that Professor Hart built his test for the
limits of "Exceptions." In response to the rhetorical question of
whether Congress might provide a minimum federal jurisdiction over
patent cases, Professor Hart responded:
The measure is simply that the exceptions must not be such
as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan. McCardle, you will remember, meets that test.
The circuit courts of the United States were still open in habeas
corpus, and the Supreme Court itself could still entertain petitions for the writ which were filed with it in the first instance. 240
The addition of review authority over federal questions in general
and over criminal cases was only statutory. Hart states that the original
habeas corpus could be brought and that this common law writ could
be used to challenge only the jurisdiction of the court or the authority
of the jailer, either of which would encompass the constitutionality of
procedure or confinement. In light of this circumvention of statutory
gaps by the Court, Professor Ratner states his conclusions about the
first bill to propose exceptions of constitutional claims:
Despite some impediments in early statutes, the Supreme
Court from its inception has performed the essential constitutional functions of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of
federal law. These functions provide a standard for testing the
validity of legislation limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Even though the legislation may narrowly restrict the procedures
for obtaining Supreme Court review, constitutional limitations
are not transgressed so long as the Court remains available ultimately to resolve conflicts between state and federal law and conflicting interpretations of federal law by lower courts. But
legislation that precludes Supreme Court review in every case involving a particular subject is an unconstitutional encroachment
on the Court's essential functions. Thus, [the Jenner proposal]
was clearly invalid. Its enactment would have allowed the courts
of each state to determine for themselves the constitutionality of
state statutes and regulations on the specified subjects and would
have permanently foreclosed Supreme Court resolution of inconsistent state and federal decisions concerning the application of
the federal constitution and laws to such matters. The exceptions
and regulations clause does not give Congress power thus to neIowa safety regulation prohibition of double trailers as excessively burdening interstate commerce, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981), is subject to preemption by
congressional authorization of such regulations. Nonetheless, the judgment of the Court
remains final in its sphere. Congress, like the Court, cannot directly reach and alter state
law.
240. Hart, supra note 20, at 1365.
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gate the essential functions of the Supreme Court.24 '
Professor Ratner's argument of the essential functions relies heavily on the structural and functional aspects of the Court's existence.
The historic lack of complete review of lower federal court decisions
and the Court's jurisdictional dependence on the substantive decision
of state courts substantially restrict the efficacy of this claim. The mere
cafpacify to provide uniformity and maintain supremacy, however, may
be all that is required under the theory.24 2 Professor Ratner's ultimate
conclusion would appear to rest on the existence of a separate right to
animate the structural and functional aspects of the essential functions
theory, although he does not explain this factor. Professor Wechsler,
on the other hand, simply does not accept this limited view of the exceptions and regulations clause, the supremacy clause, and the "essential functions" that devolved upon the Court:
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in
them to enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of
government. They do so rather for the reason that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction
and in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the
land ...
The difficulty with legislative [preclusion] of jurisdiction is
not one of constitutional dimension . . . . Congress could not,
for example, employ federal courts as organs of enforcement and
preclude them from attending to the Constitution in arriving at
decision of the cause. 43
Professor Wechsler suggests that a limitation is imposed on any attempt
to use the federal courts to enforce a given statute without reference to
the Constitution. He cites cases or remedial limitations, 2' but his enforcement approach is functionally limited to the federal courts because Congress cannot providently dictate these limitations to the state
court systems. 245 Professor Wechsler's claim would also appear to have
no validity as applied to self-executing constitutional rights in need
241. Ratner, supra note 20, at 201-02.
242. If that is the case, the historic capacity of the Court to hear all constitutional attacks
that have failed, together with the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts until the federal
courts had general federal question jurisdiction and the Supreme Court gained plenary (albeit discretionary) review powers, would fill that need.
243. Wechsler, supra note 20, at 1006.
244. Id. at 1006 n.10 (citing Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)).
245. The Court does not have supervisory power over the state court systems. The Congress may gain limited power over state court systems through the use of conditional monetary grants to the states; however, because of federalism and the limited degree of retained
sovereignty, Congress cannot mandate state court jurisdiction or procedure.
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only of enforcement. At any rate, the question is begged as to the substance of the statute itself, as was the case of infringing on the judicial
decisionmaking process in Klein.246
As Professor Sager notes, review of decisions of the state court systems is where the primary value of the essential functions theory lies.24 7
In addition to the lack of systemic congressional or judicial supervision
of the state courts, the sheer potential for conflicting interpretations of
the Constitution among fifty-four courts of last resort is great. Further,
the implication that constitutional facts must be reviewable by at least
some federal court 248 poses a substantial limitation on removing
Supreme Court review. Here, however, history has been entirely consistent: the Court has always had statutory jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts that have denied claims arising under the
Constitution.249
Thus, the essential functions theory is diametrically opposed to excepting from the jurisdiction of the Court constitutional questions arising from, at the least, state court judgments. Should such a bill
progress so far, the essential functions theory provides a formidable
model and deserves attention in the policymaking functions of the
Congress and veto decisions of the executive. Standing alone, however,
it lacks vitality as a means of adjudicating the constitutionality, both
procedurally and substantively, of a particular legislative preclusion of
an article III case or controversy of constitutional dimension. 250 From
here, attention must turn to the second aspect of Klein for aid in constitutional adjudication. Just as it was the substantive effect and interpre246. See notes 181-89 and accompanying text supra.
247. Sager, supra note 20, at 42-57.
248. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932). See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. June 28, 1982) (Nos. 81-150 & 81-546).
249. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73.
250. Adding the operative condition of the doctrine of separation of powers does not add
appreciably to the substantiality of the argument, for, in effect, the "essential functions"
theory is a separation of powers argument. Separation of powers has been the formulation
for several invalidations either of legislative or executive action as intrusive on authority
vested in the other. See note 99 supra. One example of this doctrine over the judiciary's
authority was the declination to exercise power to initially determine war veterans' claims on
the theory that review would lie in the executive branch, making the judges' actions nonjudicial. Haybur's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). The only other example of the use of
a separation of powers rationale by the judiciary to protect "essential functions" was United
States v. Klein, see text accompanying notes 181-90, in which it was claimed that a statute
intruded on the decisionmaking function of the court of claims and the Supreme Court. It
will be remembered, however, that the Klein decision was intermeshed with a separate
claim, Ze., that the Court must give effect to the presidential pardon granted to Klein's
decedent.
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" '
tation of a presidential pardon that breathed life into Klein's claim,25
all constitutional adjudicatory analysis of exceptions must accordingly
include, as a factor, consideration of whether or not a specific constitutional right is being affected by operation of the challenged exception.

C.

A Synergetic View of the Amended Constitution and Jurisdictional
Exceptions to Constitutional Claims

In considering the scope of the original (unamended) Constitution,
we have already noted that the various clauses must be read as internally consistent. The Bill of Rights and the subsequent amendments to
the Constitution serve different purposes and have different effects.
The Bill of Rights, as has been noted in the limited context of the Seventh and Eleventh Amendments, 252 was corrective by design. The
guarantee of enumerated individual rights was intentionally a limitation on the government, and those enumerated rights have since been
supplemented on several occasions.2 53 Professor Wechsler has stated:
There is, to be sure, a school of thought that argues that "exceptions" has a narrow meaning, not including cases that have
constitutional dimension; or that the supremacy clause or the due
process clause of the fifth amendment would be violated by an
alteration of the jurisdiction motivated by hostility to the decisions of the Court. I see no basis for this view and think it antithetical to the plan of the Constitution for the courts.25 4
From the point of view that the original Constitution appears to include sufficient room for the proposition that Congress may limit the
Court's jurisdiction over "constitutional" cases, via the supremacy
clause or otherwise, this may be true. The reference to the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause must be considered, however, to be a
reference to aperse theory that the clause is violated by an exception
of constitutional cases. On the contrary, as a matter of application to
inferior courts, Judge Augustus Hand noted:
We think . . . that the exercise by Congress of its control over
jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress
has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so
251. Only when the existence and effect of the pardon was established could the issue of
the statute's constitutionality arise.
252. See notes 109-18 and accompanying text supra.
253. The specific guarantees of the 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th Amendments
are in marked contrast to the government organization and powers of the 16th, 17th, 20th,
and 25th Amendments.
254. Wechsler, supra note 20, at 1005.
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exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or to take private property
without just compensation. 2 "
This dictum by a lower federal court runs counter to Professor Wechsler's commentary that there is no per se violation of the due process
clause, but the real issue is whether the application of the exception
deprives a person of due process. In this functional mode, an exception
must also be tested against the particular enumerated rights of the Bill
of Rights and subsequent explicit guarantees. The powers of government are in all ways restricted by explicit rights guaranteed in the
Constitution.2 5 6
A major debate over passage of the Bill of Rights focused, as today, on the effect of enumerating rights. Madison's oft-quoted remarks
on the subject provide a useful starting point.
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those fights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which
were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands
of the General Government, and were consequently insecure.
This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard
urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system;
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted
it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth
resolution [eventually the Ninth Amendment].
It has been said, that it is unnecessary to load the constitution with this provision, because it was not found effectual in the
constitution of the particular States. It is true, there are a few
particular States in which some of the most valuable articles have
not, at one time or another, been violated; but it does not follow
but they may have, in a certain degree, a salutary effect against
the abuse of power. If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in
a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
255. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
887 (1948). Battaglia challenged the jurisdictional limitations of the Portal-to-Portal Act on
the basis of a 5th Amendment due process challenge. As the court found no due process
right, there was no need to determine whether -the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate that
right.
256. The multitude of cases that underline this common statement need not be catalogued here. The most conspicuous of cases suffices to illustrate that unless a particular
governmental powers amendment was intended to alter or limit a specific right guaranteed
by a previous amendment, the previous amendment will effectively limit a later governmental power. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state power to regulate intoxicating
liquors under 21st Amendment limited by equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment).
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legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.'
For organizational purposes, though not adoption, the conservative
political notion might be introduced that the degree to which rights are
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments is dependent upon whether the action in their regard is expressly prohibited,
implicit from the requirement of governmental protection, or assumed
from the structure and function of the government and the clauses of
the Constitution.
If any limitation on the power of Congress to enact exceptions of
constitutional claims from the Court's appellate jurisdiction must be
activated by invoking the rights themselves, the device of limiting
rights by removing jurisdiction to adjudicate them must also be subjected to review under those rights. Any limitation on the power of
Congress in this regard must flow directly from the incapacity of Congress to effect the rights in question. Thus, it is necessary to examine
the several rights involved in contemporary exceptions legislation.
Assuming that the affected right is one expressly, directly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights or another substantive guarantee, the question
becomes whether that particular right limits the exceptions and regulations clause. Assuming instead, however, that the right affected is not
textually established and defined, one must look to the contextual
framework of the right and, if all else fails, the substantive values of the
Constitution and how these values are interpreted. It is along this shifting spectrum of lessening certainty that the analysis will proceed."'
The dual rights to the free exercise of religion and to be free from
the governmental establishment of religion might be the premier examples from the contemporary debate of rights textually found in the
Constitution that may restrict the right of Congress to except "constitutional cases" from the Court's jurisdiction. In the first instance, the
preamble of the First Amendment prohibits congressional action in the
area of religious liberty: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
257. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456-57 (Madison, (C), Va.) June 8, 1789).
258. The spectrum itself is disputable. We might begin with the least controversial and
most acceptable form of constitutional interpretation, that of textual review, go so far as the
enumeration of substantive values that an individual may embrace, and posit all such positions as legitimately a part of the judicial power. The last of these are clearly minority
views. See, e.g., Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-andlts Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
223 (1981); Tribe, supra note 20; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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This provision does not directly guarantee the right; rather, it

assumes the right and prohibits interference. The extant standards for
the interpretation of the right are to be found in the cases of the very
type that Congress seeks to limit-Engel v. Vitale259 and Abington
Township School District v. Schempp.26° In Engel, the Court dealt with
a specific regulation and practice of the New York state schools of reciting the "Regents' Prayer" each day:
We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York had adopted
a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of
daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the
Regents' prayer is a religious activity. .

.

.[W]e think that the

constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no
part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government. 61
H.R. 865 and S. 481, in the Ninety-seventh Congress, definitionally exclude this type of written prayer from their ambit.262 Furthermore, the
limitation of the statute to "voluntary" prayer is an attempted "savings" clause; however, there is substantial doubt as to whether the "voluntariness" device would work. The statute could be held invalid on
the ground that public school regulation of student conduct inherently
vitiates voluntariness. 2 63 Even so, as the Court noted directly in Engel:
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral
nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause ....
The Establishment Clause.

.

.does not depend upon any show-

ing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
259. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
260. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

261. 370 U.S. at 424-25.
262. See note 12 supra.
263. It is possible to avoid the entire question of constitutionality by reaching a conclusion that school children can exercise no constitutional voluntarism in complying with even
the faintest suggestion by a teacher that they may pray if they so choose and that, in effect,
any suggestion at all may be deemed coercive. This is merely a use of the common tactic of
avoiding constitutional decisions wherever possible. Begging additional litigation by beginning down this road, however, without concluding the trip to a firm rule, is itself reason to
reach the constitutional issue. Thus, if the choice is one of reaching the constitutional issue
or creating a rule with unknown long-term effects, the former is preferable.
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2 64

not.

The direct relation of the state law to the limitation of power under the
First Amendment obviates any need for coercive action on the part of
the state.
Shortly after Engel, a requirement that verses of the Holy Bible be
read at the beginning of each school day was challenged in Schempp.
The Court rejected the secular purposes proffered by the state and stipulated future standards:
[W]hat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or ihibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.265
In addition, the Court has added a third test-that the statute in question not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion. "266
"Secular purpose," "principal or primary effect," and "non-excessive entanglement" are the three separate tests under which the school
prayer proposals, such as H.R. 865267 and S.481268 in the Ninety-seventh Congress, could be declared unconstitutional. Considering the
ongoing litigation of government-religion separation, the impatience of
the Court with that litigation, and the rhetoric supporting such proposals, survival of the school prayer bill from a constitutional attack appears doubtful. In the first instance, such bills do not appear to meet
the substantive requirements of the Engel and Schempp cases which
they seek to limit.2 69 Also, the device of "voluntariness" may be seen
as ineffectual, since prayer is suggested by the authority figure of
teachers.27 o
Of similar contextual clarity is the issue of "busing." If the current
proposals were recast in a form more amenable to treatment as jurisdictional-for example, to except appellate jurisdiction over cases relating
264. 370 U.S. at 430.
265. 374 U.S. at 222.
266. E.g., Lemon 1,403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See generally note 13 supra.
267. 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
268. Id.
269. This is to suggest that the current school prayer bill is unconstitutional because it is
an "encouragement" of religion in violation of Engel; its primary and principal effect is to
remove the Supreme Court from adjudicating complaints about religious exercises, thereby
suggesting to local authorities license to engage in establishment of religion in schools.
270. See note 263 supra.

846
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to pupil composition of schools based on race-the proposal would be
within the analytical framework of this article. The prohibition of racial discrimination is contextually founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. It seems clear that a direct proposal to
limit desegregation would be suspect. 271
The removal of the Supreme Court's capacity to review school desegregation cases is not distinguishable from other methods implicating
student assignment that were formally nondiscriminatory criteria but
that were discriminatory in application-such as direct pupil placement

laws; 272 freedom of choice plans, 273 zoning, or a combination of the
two;27 minority transfer plans;275 and school closings. 276 State interfer-

ence with the process of desegregation has been struck down,2 " and it
seems doubtful that the Court would welcome a congressionally mandated end to its overseeing of the process. Assuming only a case that
might necessarily be brought in federal court where past discriminatory
practice could be proved, the action of Congress in removing jurisdiction would become the predicate action continuing that discrimination.
Accordingly, the jurisdictional exception would fail for the same reason
that all the other facially neutral actions failed: discriminatory impact.278 Furthermore, such a proposal would encourage public educational discrimination far more significantly than did the California
constitutional prohibition of statutes providing for equal treatment in
housing opportunities that was struck down in Reitman v. Mulkey; 279
the Akron charter provision-requiring housing opportunity legislation
to traverse a more rigorous gauntlet than normal ordinances-that was
271. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
272. E.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 904 (1969); Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
273. E.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 443 (1968).
274. E.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 333 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964).
275. E.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
276. E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See also Hall v. St. Helena
Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aft'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Bush v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960), aftd, 365 U.S.
569 (1961).
277. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
278. Only H.R. 869, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), would appear to fail on this point.
Most busing bills are limitations on remedies, although these may fail as an interference
under Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971), and Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
279. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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struck down in Hunter v. Erickson;180 or the state of Washington's assumption of direct control (here, by referendum) over whether to use
busing in a school district's desegregation plan that was struck down in
Washington v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1.281 Jurisdictional modification that encourages racial discrimination would appear no less suspect
than legislation that would have the same effect more directly. This is
not to say that Congress could not repeal the entirety of the civil rights
laws currently in the United States Code, assuming its intent was not to
encourage discrimination, but only to say that Congress cannot affirmatively enact legislation having a discriminatory effect. Nor does section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provide shelter from such an
analysis under the congressional authority specifically provided-authority to legislate implementation of the requirements of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment--even though this type of
proposal appears to be antithetical to equal protection.
At the other end of the spectrum, where perhaps the least textual
and contextual support for the substantive rights involved may be
found, lies the question of abortion. 282 Roe v. Wade283 and Doe v. Bolton 284 establish the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy and base that right on the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever one's view regarding the legitimacy of
that right, it must be admitted that there is no textual or contextual
support for the conclusion reached. Rather, the right to an abortion is
a substantive right created by the Court and is based on the values of
the Constitution as interpreted by the Court at the time of the decision.285 The lack of textual or contextual support for the right of a
woman to choose to have an abortion is the underlying basis for much
of the political debate over the efficacy of the right, whether couched in
terms of granting the state and Congress the power to regulate abortion
by a constitutional amendment 286 or of prohibiting the Supreme Court
280. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
281. 50 U.S.L.W. 4998 (U.S. June 30, 1982) (No. 81-9). A more direct approach was
taken and struck down in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y.), affid, 402 U.S. 935
(1971). The Court has distinguished these evasive tactics from the mere repeal, without
more, of statutory requirements greater than the minimum imposed by the 14th Amendment. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 50 U.S.L.W. 5016 (U.S. June 30, 1982) (No. 81-38).
282. The decisional history concerning abortion indicates substantial vacillation over the
"morality" of the act. Morality, however, ought to play no part in the process of constitutional decisionmaking. Here the problem is one of the lack, until recently, of any contextual
reference, consideration, or concern for abortion.
283. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
284. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
285. See Tribe, supra note 20.
286. E.g., S.J. Res. 16, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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from reviewing state or inferior federal court decisions on abortion.28 7
Substantial differences will arise over the order and relative merit
of the spectrum of constitutional interpretation of rights, and these are
but some preliminary thoughts on the manner of addressing the interface of an exception of cases based on a constitutional right with the
legitimacy of that right in se. Contextually supported rights are more
likely to receive protection against exceptions from Supreme Court appellate review than rights newly created by the Court. Nonetheless, the
question of excepting constitutional claims from the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction will arise in this substantive manner.
Conclusion: The Adjudicatory Framework
The adjudicatory path for reaching an outcome in a case of exception of classes of constitutional rights, at least, is clear. Assuming that a
particular bill becomes law and that the law provides for an exclusion
of jurisdiction from the lower federal courts, a case and controversy
must arise in a state court system. The adjudication of the right by the
state courts need not affirm or deny the federal right, for, as a general
matter, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the case by varying
methods.288 The immediate question facing the Court is whether it has
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter presented. There are
only two alternative consequences of accepting jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction: either (a) the limitation of jurisdiction is constitutional and the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed further, or (b) the
limitation on jurisdiction is unconstitutional and the Court must proceed to the merits of the claim.
The claim must be of a constitutional dimension in order to raise
the current question, and obviously it must be the claim sought to be
excepted from the Court's jurisdiction. The question of the jurisdiction
of the Court, however, is not immediately tied to the claim itself. First,
the Court must consider the authority under which Congress has enacted the exception. The plaintiff bears the burden of going forward
and persuading the Court to look beyond the presumption that the enactment is constitutional. As has been discussed, the text and direct
context of the Constitution do not provide support for the notion that
Congress has authority to make constitutional exceptions, nor does his287. Eg., H.R. 867, S. 583, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This should not be read to suggest that the right to an abortion is any less constitutional than other rights, merely that there
is less textual support, and, thus, greater.vulnerability to attack.
288. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) with id. at § 1257 (2) (1976). See notes 192-93 and
accompanying text supra.
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tory support that notion, nor is such a notion precluded. In essence, the
question before the Court will be novel. The party claiming the right
will advocate that the essential functions of the Court are implicated
and that only the Supreme Court is capable of providing for uniform
interpretation of the Constitution in compliance with the supremacy
clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. This argument will be
pitted against the plethora of the Court's own dicta of deference to the
Congress over the scope ofjurisdiction. An outcome on this issue alone
is unlikely.
Next, the party claiming the right must show that the exception
itself does violence to the right claimed. Here it is inescapable that the
Court will extend the line of jurisprudence under the Constitution in
order to resolve the argued collision of right and congressional power.
Indeed, the right claimed and the power asserted by Congress must in
fact collide in order for the party claiming the right to argue the cause.
Further, the legitimacy of the right asserted will be again tested. Textually and contextually based rights provide a clear path to adjudicatory
choice within the bounds of the clauses of the Constitution itself.
Rights that the Court has interpolated from the Constitution and contemporary values will face a far sterner challenge.
Thus, the question returns remarkably to the bifurcated analysis
and decision of Klein. The case would be clearer if, as in Klein, the
outcome were proscribed by the statute. Nonetheless, the litigatory requirement that the right animate and collide with the asserted power
provides sufficient clarity of the outcome-determinativeness of the exceptions of constitutional claims from the Court's jurisdiction. If the
Court ultimately finds that the claim is of the constitutional nature jurisdictionally proscribed by the statute, the only alternative short of declaring the statute unconstitutional would be dismissal. Thus, Klein,
not McCardle, is the appropriate standard for consideration, and constitutional development should hinge on this precedent.
The impact of legislating and adjudicating exceptions of constitutional claims from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is highly
speculative. Exceptions from jurisdiction in which the constitutional
claim is founded on express textual prohibitions of governmental action, such as the First Amendment's prohibition of congressional enactments respecting an establishment of religion, are unconstitutional,
whether such a claim is based on the infringement on the Court's essential functions in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, or
directly as a violation of the First Amendment. Exceptions from jurisdiction in which the constitutional claim is founded on contextual
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rights, such as the prohibition of racial discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment, are more problematic, but past decisions indicate
that the discrimination that would be established by such an exception
would be struck down.2 89 Exceptions from jurisdiction based on
nontextual rights, such as abortion, pose much more substantial
problems-first, in establishing a nexus between the right to an abortion and the Court's jurisdiction; second, in pressing the effects of the
limitation on the Court's essential functions. The question of whether
the constitutional fabric of government would withstand such a direct
conflict between the powers of Congress and the Court warrants the
most serious avoidance.

289. Read together, Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 50 U.S.L.W. 4998 (U.S.
June 30, 1982) (No. 81-9), Crawford v. Board of Education, 50 U.S.L.W. 5016 (U.S. June 30,
1982) (No. 81-38), and Northern Pipe Line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 50
U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. June 28, 1982) (Nos. 81-150 & 81-546), indicate that the Court is fully
cognizant of the potential for further evasion of desegregation by either the states or
Congress.

